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JOHN K. RYAN
Chicago Sun Times

The Homewood Fire Department was taken to task in a report on how it handled a fire that cost the lives of a firefighter and an elderly resident.


The report from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health looked into factors leading to the death of Homewood firefighter-paramedic Brian Carey, 28, during a house fire March 30.

The report concludes the commanding officer and crew that responded to the scene didn't follow some key guidelines for fighting fires. Among the report's findings:


- The commander on the scene, Homewood fire Lt. Scott Moran, did not do a complete assessment of the fire scene before crews were sent into the burning home.


- Poor tactical decisions were made on how to try to extinguish the fire, including sending Carey and fellow firefighters Karra Kopas and Chris Kieta into the building with a hose that was too big to maneuver within the house.


- Firefighters did not stay within visual, physical or vocal contact with each other at all times while fighting the fire. Firefighters inside lost contact with Carey during the fire, and while he was equipped with a handheld radio, it was found in the back pocket of his pants under his firefighting gear, making it inaccessible.


- Moran and crew members outside the home didn't recognize signs of the deteriorating situation and order firefighters out of the building. Thick, black and heavily pressurized smoke billowing from windows on one side of the Homewood house should have warned those outside that a flashover soon could occur.


- The department didn't have adequate staffing to fight the fire. Homewood Fire Chief Bob Grabowski declined comment on the report.


Copyright 2010 Sun-Times Media, LLC
All Rights Reserved
September 21, 2010

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From the NIOSH report: It was reported to NIOSH investigators that the victim entered the structure wearing a full array of
personal protective clothing and equipment, consisting of turnout gear (coat and pants), helmet, gloves,
boots, and a SCBA with an integrated personal alert safety system (PASS) device, but his Nomex®
hood and helmet were unaccounted for when he was located and removed from the structure. Note:
Fire fighters interviewed by NIOSH investigators do not recall whether the victim was wearing his
Nomex® hood when he entered the house. The victim’s facepiece was properly connected to his
regulator, but when he was found and removed from the structure he was not wearing his facepiece.
The victim’s PASS device was alarming when he was located in the house.
did it say if he was out of air?

or pinned under something?
From one of the TLP's links above...

"The two Hazel Crest firefighters took a second hose and went back in to find Carey. The original hose had ruptured. They found Carey in the kitchen/laundry area, entangled in the hose and not wearing his helmet or a facepiece. They quickly removed him from the house."

In the short amount of time described, and with his helmet, facepiece, and hood off, it would be astonishing if he was out of air unless his SCBA was almost empty when he entered the structure.

More importantly, "The report noted that Carey, Kopas and the unnamed incident commander had combined for just 24 hours of "fire behavior training" out of more than 5,654 total training hours in the department." That also tells me that there were two rookies inside without supervision when the 3rd firefighter had to back out due to the problem with his flash hood. That problems with that situation are pretty obvious.

That would help explain the absence of a SCBA - it's unclear if he ever donned his mask. With or without a mask, no one is going to survive the flashover pictured above for more than a few seconds. It sounds as if the other firefighters did a righteous job of rescuing Firefighter Kopas.
does it say what was the lapse of time from him putting the pack on - until he was found in the bldg?

yes, without water - it must have been hot as hell - irregardless of air

both excessive heat and being out of air might prompt him to pull off his helmet, hood, and mask

COMBINED 24 hours - OUCH !!! Related back to WHO sent them into the bldg.
there's a timeline of the incident in the NIOSH report.
was that your nice way of saying - Heather go read the damn report yourself !!!
They had a more experienced firefighter with them, but he retreated due to the problem with his flash hood. In my department, that means that the entire company retreats together - especially if the most experienced one is the one with the gear problem.

The point here is that there is no evidence in any of the reports that shows that he ever donned his mask and hood. Remember, they had a repor of a trapped victim, so they were in rescue mode from the rip, so they were hurrying. They were in such a hurry that they apparently didn't do a 360, ventilate the pre-flashover smoke that sounds like what Dave Dotson calls "Black Fire", and the hoseline reportedly only made it 12 feet inside the house. That's a looooooong 12 feet in a flashover.

The air level in his SCBA will likely be unknown until the NIOSH report is made public. We'll see it in a year or so...
But if you have limited training - calming yourself - then you might quickly pull off your mask and helmet. And anything not attached to you like your helmet and hood could be lost far away from your body somewhere in the fire.

This is an important training piece. It is not just book knowledge, it can be fear management - as well as the obvious air and heat management. And with limited training he could have sucked down his air tank quickly - especially when he had line failure.

And YUP - IF YOU GO IN together - YOU GO OUT together!
Why he didn't have on his mask is entirely speculative, and we'll never know unless someone saw him either enter without it or pull it off while inside.

I've had a good friend killed in similar circumstances, and we knew why he took his mask off - the facepiece was shattered and the hole was too big for him to seal it with his hand. There was a partial collapse in a hallway that cut off his primary escape route. He made it to a window, broke it, and tossed his helmet out, but the window wasn't large enough to get him out and so I went to a LODD funeral of one of my best friends when I was 22. The difference was that we knew he had his mask on, what happened to it, and how much air he had left in his cylinder. He was relatively inexperienced, lost crew contact...the rest of it sounds very similar to what happened in Homewood.

One of the lessons from that event was that I try to avoid speculation when there are so many different possibilities and no real evidence to support any one over the others.
Hmmmm, since I answered some of your questions by posting quotes from the top-line poster's links, it would be nice if you'd do your own homework.
Ben, I am sorry for the loss of your friend.

Yes, we discuss to learn - much is always speculative.

We always checked to ensure our partner was initially geared properly before entering.
He was the first of many, unfortunately.

I HATE funerals, especially LODD funerals.

I've been to way too many of them.

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