Some fire officers can lead their personnel through the gates of hell and back... others couldn't lead a herd of cats even if they were wearing turnouts made of tuna...
As a trustee for our fire protection district, if we had what you have described, then I would be meeting with the chief.
We pay stipends to 3 LTs, 3 Capts., 1 AC and Chief.
If the chief is performing line tasks, I have a problem. It might be low turnout for calls or it might be that the responders weren't grasping what the IC was telling them and he decided to just do it himself or he likes performing tasks and passes command. I have a problem with ALL of those scenarios and I will work with the department to resolve them.
Fire departments function much more efficiently when there is a chain of command and SOGs are followed.
And that doesn't matter if you are a department in a district of 1100 people like we are or a major metro area.
If you are in an area where you only get one or two showing up for a call or are short to the point that you need Chiefy humping hose, then you got some serious issues to resolve.
I'm just sayin'.
My perspective.
TCSS.
Art
If the chief is performing line tasks, I have a problem. It might be low turnout for calls or it might be that the responders weren't grasping what the IC was telling them and he decided to just do it himself or he likes performing tasks and passes command.
Art, you are missing the point. This was NOT the IC going inside...this was another chief officer assigned to the role. I am not talking about command going inside and I never mentioned anything about the IC being inside. I have simply stated there are times a chief officer may be in a position where the use of an SCBA should be worn. Not necessarily on air, but to at least have one on.
This is not about a low turnout on calls, this was a career dept where this went to multiple alarms and every chief officer off duty was notified. There were companies working on a defensive operation and it was determined by the IC, inside the command vehicle, not mobile, not walking around inside, not on air, that the best way to save the rest of the structure was to do as described. The battalion chief who was assigned to that branch could not have a good view of operations and did go inside. He was not on air, but still had on an SCBA in case things went bad.
The whole basis of this discussion for me was to indicate that there are times a chief officer may be inside and there are times a chief officer should have an SCBA. Just because there is a white helmet does NOT mean a chief officer will always have to be in a command or strategic role.That is the point.
Ben, I don't know if your department is registered with the state mobilization mutual aid program or not? If you are, and you responded with a crew to wherever incident and you were asked by that IC to take a roll inside that structure for a sector would you take it? I mean this could be an example of what John is saying? There could be a time this could take place? I'm not saying you would take the job, you might not or you might. I've been on these incidents and been placed in that position more than once,as a Chief officer.
I see a couple of things wrong with the above scenario...
1) Mixing defensive and offensive operations breaks a basic firefighting rule. I'm glad you guys got away with it.
2) Using PARs as the accountability system rather than maintaining division-by-division accountability works only if nothing goes wrong. Once again, I'm glad you guys got away with it.
3) Chief officers functioning tactically tends to mean that a) the chief doesn't trust the company officers to carry out their assignments without micromanagement or b) the chief doesn't know how to run an assignment that he/she can't reach out and touch, or both. Part of leadership is trusting your people - especially your company officers - to do their jobs. If you have bad company officers that can't be trusted to carry out their assignments without chief-level micromanagement, then your department has a bigger problem than what kind of leadership you think chief officers should exert.
4) Running big fires "just like it was a room and contents fire" was something that Charleston got away with...until June 18, 2007.
Using SCBA has nothing to do with leadership...unless you base leadership on having a chief operate one or two levels below his/her intended role while micromanaging small groups of firefighters within arm's reach. Leadership has more to do with being able to lead when you're in a situation where you can't reach out and touch every firefighter you're leading.
And...I'm a training officer, I maintain my medical clearance/FF physical, and I teach SCBA use and annual recertifications to my department and a couple of special ops teams, and my ability to be or not be a leader isn't based on my ability to don SCBA or my ability to not maintain the strategic picture while blinded by the smoke.
And...I've answered what wearing SCBA has to do with a chief's leadership ability over and over, but here's the answer again...
"SCBA use has nothing to do with a chief's leadership ability."
Here are a few more answers...
"It is a bad practice to put chief officers into fireground positions where they need to wear SCBA."
"If a chief fills a role below strategic where he/she has to wear a SCBA, then there's something wrong. It might be poor positioning, it might be too many chiefs and not enough indians, it might be mistrust of company officers, it might be poor leadership through micromanagement, but it's a sign that something is wrong either with the scene, the organization, the response, or a combination."
As far as SCBA use goes, in my opinion, anyone on the fireground needs to familiar with an airpack, including Chiefs, Safety, and EOs (drivers). Conditions can change as fast as the weather in Texas.
So, the cops, the EMS crew, and the electric company guys who pull the meter need SCBA qualifications to operate on the exterior of a structure fire, too?
FF Mobilization for fires tends to be wildfires, where SCBA use by anyone is very unlikely. FF Mobilization assignments tend to be run as a Strike Team or a Task Force, broken down as follows:
Strike Team/Task Force Leader - Chief Officer, responsible for team strategy.
Company Officers - Captains or Lieutenants, responsible for team tactics
Firefighters - responsible for tasks
That's a classic example of the Three Levels of Command as explained by Al Brunacini in 1985.
"Strategy" doesn't refer to just a huge, overall strategy. Chief Officers operating at the Division, Group, Task Force, or Strike Team level are responsible for implementing strategic goals in their part of the command structure. Ditto for Command Staff officers like the Safety Officer or General Staff officers, particularly the Operations Chief.
1) Mixing defensive and offensive operations breaks a basic firefighting rule. I'm glad you guys got away with it.
Hmmm....gee, yeah you would want to think that this was a mix of offensive and defensive operations simultaneously, but the inside crews were making a cut, away from the fire, to make a stop, not in an IDLH environment, they weren't even on air. Yeah I guess the prudent thing to have done was just sit outside and let the fire burn the entire complex leaving several hundred more people homeless.
2) Using PARs as the accountability system rather than maintaining division-by-division accountability works only if nothing goes wrong. Once again, I'm glad you guys got away with it.
Yeah, amazing we only used one person in accountability vs every division with their very own. I mean we have all sorts of people around just to fill such a role like you do. Accountability is still responsibility of everyone on a scene and still comes down to the company. So when our IC calls for a PAR and asks for a PAR from each division and they have E-1, E-2 and say L-2, yep they're there, ok ask the company to see if they still have PAR too, especially if crews go interior at some point too.
3) Chief officers functioning tactically tends to mean that a) the chief doesn't trust the company officers to carry out their assignments without micromanagement or b) the chief doesn't know how to run an assignment that he/she can't reach out and touch, or both.
Yep, once again jump to conclusions. Or it could be the fact that there was not a company level officer available to fill the role on the inside. It couldn't also have been the coordination of several crews operating in different units, trying to make a cut that meets up without the trench cut being too far off. I mean gee, a 3 story trench cut in a multi unit housing complex is an everyday type of task. I mean heck we just did one of those yesterday they are so commonplace.
I guess it would have been better to rape a crew of a company officer to complete such a task, meanwhile we can have six white helmets on the outside thinking the fire out.
4) Running big fires "just like it was a room and contents fire" was something that Charleston got away with...until June 18, 2007.
Yeah, because I said the accountability was run just like a room and contents. The same basic type of accountability for a room and contents, but it is on a larger scale. Instead you forgot the accountability part and decided to assume that this operation was just like a room and contents. Well, gee, isn't the small fires just run like the large fires? I'm mean there will always be command, there will always be an operations, etc....as the incident grows larger, so does the command structure....isn't that basic NIMS??
And...
What kind of leadership is a chief officer showing if he goes inside wearing SCBA but doesn't go on air?
The same kind of leadership a company officer would show when you are operating in an area where there is no IDLH environment. You wear one in case things go bad, or you need to mask up.I guess for a fire alarm sounding, false alarm, your guys go in on air and everything since they should have their SCBA's on then right? I mean what kind of leadership is that company officer showing by not being on air?
"It is a bad practice to put chief officers into fireground positions where they need to wear SCBA."
So are finally going to acknowledge then that it is entirely possible for a chief to be in a position where they may have to have an SCBA? I agree that a chief should be outside in command of a fireground, but there may be times a chief may have to be in an SCBA. Are those times ideal? Absolutely not. Is it bad practice? Absolutely. That has been my contention all along is that there is a possibility a chief may have to be in an SCBA and not every situation calls for the practicality of being outside.
Yes, there are cases of times when there are more chiefs than indians, but does that mean the chief can't fill a lessor role if needed? Happens all the time in volly depts...as long as another chief is still in command, a chief can fill a company officer role if needed, what's wrong with that? Does a chief forget how to do such a role because they are promoted? It isn't ideal, it isn't good practice, but it can happen and does happen and THAT has been my point all along.
Ben, The State Mobilization is not just for wildland fires. My department was sent to a power plant that had coal bins on fire which was a part of the State Mobilization.This fire took quite a few days with shifts rotating around the clock. Any way there was times that the IC would assigned me a sector. Why did he do this, who knows why? I didn't question his motives, I followed what job he wanted done ! That job was fighting a fire inside on the fourth floor of a power plant. Had to be in a pack on air, talking about coal here, you know the kind that can go boom, from a dust explosion ! I had a crew of four guys in that sector. The whole point here is ,I was placed in that position, wearing a pack, and completed the assignment. Those things that you listed could of been some of his reasons, I don't know, and I didn't ask. In your department you probably have enough Chiefs and firefighters to operate the way you do, and there is nothing wrong with that, but not every department has that privilege. He wasn't micro-managing, he was working with what he had at that time.
I'm wondering why a task that took four firefighters also required a chief to supervise it, but I wasn't there.
I've been a member of a single-station volly department that operated two engines, one tanker, and one brush truck out of a single house. We had a chief, an assistant chief, three captains, and three lieutenants with about 20 to 25 other firefighters. (membership fluctuated a little)
Our chiefs never went interior...and that was back in the 1970's. One of those chiefs taught SCBA for MFRI, so it wasn't about ability. I've been a member of several other departments, both career and volly, that followed the same policy. If the volly department needed to be over-officered due to fluctuations in daytime availability or the volly's paid job shift work, we over-officered the company officer positions, not the chiefs. That way, we didn't have to worry about putting a chief in a tactical position. Our captains were qualified to be the acting chief if all of the white helmets weren't around.
If the "interior" crews on your offensive/defensive fire were so far away from the fire that they made a once-in-a-career 3-story trench cut without being on air, that doesn't exactly shore up the position that the chief supervising them needs to be SCBA qualified.
Ben, I understand what your saying completely. I really don't know what the IC was thinking on those tours. After two rotations I did ask him, wouldn't I be more beneficial out there near the command, and his reply was I need your in there with that team ! Whether it was a lack of trust, or some of the other things you mention, I don't know? I will tell you this, I'm glad I did go in because there was a lack of safety going on. These coal bins had a 50 ft. drop to the bottom, they had safety rails around the perimeter of them. The firefighters had no safety harnesses on and there was no air quality or temperature readings taken place. I brought that rotation to a halt, we all evac. to the outside. I immediately went up to the State rep. who had just arrived on scene and reported my findings. He immediately brought the whole operation to a stand still until those issues were put in place! What I was trying to get across was, even a chief officer sometimes has to wear an SCBA. I too felt I would be more of benefit to command, but it just worked out different.