What’s Good About the Box?
Before thinking “outside the box” related to a new tactic, strategy or piece of equipment, we must first test the theory against 6 fire service principles

By Jim Baird

Think “outside the box.” This seems to be the mantra for every endeavor we can imagine. It’s no longer acceptable to stick with the status quo even if the status quo works really well. We’re encouraged to never be satisfied—to constantly seek new and improved ways to do things. And we’re considered closed-minded if we dare to think that something is “good enough.”

In this article, I’ll discuss “the box” and the benefits it provides. I’ll also address when to stay in the box and how to think outside it.

Acknowledge the Box
What is “the box”? I believe the box is the sum total of proven knowledge on any given subject. By “proven knowledge,” I mean that which we know is true and has been proven by repeated, practical use. Furthermore, I believe that very few people realize that thinking outside the box implies the necessity of the box itself. One cannot think “outside” of what does not exist. Too philosophical for you? Here’s a practical example.

The driving principle behind powered flight is the law of lift vs. drag and gravity. If we can create enough lift, we can make any object fly. However, once the effects of drag and gravity overcome the force of the lift, the object will cease to fly. This is what we know to be true (aka, the box).

Powered flight has taken several forms: the lighter-than-air craft, the winged aircraft and the rocket. In all cases, those who conceived of flight in its various forms had to deal with “the box” (lift vs. drag and gravity). One overcame these hurdles by making the craft lighter than air. Another overcame the hurdles by using a combination of speed and the wing to create sufficient lift to make a heavier-than-air craft fly. And yet another used sheer thrust without the need of a wing to drive the craft into the sky—and eventually into space.

The one thing they had in common was a clear understanding of the presence of “the box” and the rules by which it was defined. Furthermore, each understood the consequences of poor or reckless thinking outside the box. (In the early days of WWI, thousands of flyers died experimenting with learning how to fly.) Herein lays the benefit of the box, especially for the fire service: It defines for us that which cannot be ignored or denied. It sets for us the parameters of our imagination. On any given subject, the box tells us how far we can go and when we must stop.

The 6 Sides of the Fire Service Box
With that being said, I want to take a shot at the virtually impossible task of defining “the box” in which the fire service lives. I want to define that which cannot be ignored or denied as it pertains to how we do our job. Further, I want to instill in you the idea that thinking outside the box without first understanding the box itself can be very dangerous. I want to instill the notion that, because of the consequences, actually stepping outside the fire service box should be done with great care, forethought and only in the training setting until such practices are proven to be safe and effective.

So what is the “fire service box”? What is it that we know to be true that cannot be ignored or denied? I will use the analogy of an actual box and limit this to six principles. Each principle represents one side—the top, bottom and four sides—of the fire service box.

Side No. 1 (the Top)—Fire Burns Up: This has two meanings. The obvious meaning is that fire left to itself will travel upward rather than sideward or downward. More importantly, fire is a consuming agent. There is no benign fire. It always endeavors to turn matter into energy. This transformation changes the fuel into something that is generally weaker than it was prior to consumption. In addition, it is impartial to the fuel it consumes. In short, fire destroys.

Side No. 2 (the Bottom)—Gravity Pulls Down: The force of gravity pulls all things to the ground eventually. When we combine fire (the top) and gravity (the bottom), we have the single most clear understanding of that which cannot be ignored or denied: Burning buildings will collapse.

Side No. 3 (Alpha)—Fires Breath Air & Emit $hit: This speaks to the incompatibility of human life in the presence of fire in a confined space. Humans cannot hope to survive long in the presence of an uncontrolled fire in a confined space. We will die either from the lack of oxygen or from breathing the poisons emitted by the fire. Coupled with the consuming nature of fire, we are no match for it.

Side No. 4 (Bravo)—Fires Burn Until Something Stops Them: Given enough heat, fuel and air, fires will continue to burn. The only exception to this is when man (or perhaps God) intervenes.

Side No. 5 (Charlie)—Smoke Is the Language of Fire: If we don’t take the time to learn how to read the smoke and find out what it’s telling us, or if we ignore its warnings, then we will continue to blindly go where we shouldn’t. In addition, “modern smoke” is proving to be at least as dangerous to the firefighter and victim as the fire itself.

Side No. 6 (Delta)—The Human Body Is the Weak Link in our System: Our modern equipment and methods outperform our human physiology. We now have turnout gear that can survive a flashover when the human inside won’t. We endorse tactics and strategy that place us in situations where our performance is overwhelmed by the circumstances. We believe, falsely, that ours is a responsibility unto death, regardless of the risk or the benefit. We believe we are less vulnerable than we are.

What Does It All Mean?
The big picture for the fire service box is this: Failure to understand the nature of the box does and will continue to get us killed unnecessarily!

Although I will readily acknowledge that the definition of the fire service box may be incomplete or in dispute, I believe these six sides represent ideas we know to be true and that have been proven through successful, repeated, practical examples. Hence, when we set about thinking “outside the box” related to any new tactics/strategies/equipment, all six sides of the box must be considered. If we fail to do so, the new tactics/strategies/equipment will become a source of potential danger or hardship. Let me provide a few examples from our history. (Forgive me if I tread on some sacred ground.)

Example No. 1—New Tactics: Fog Stream vs. Straight Stream Fire Attacks: This was the big debate when I first became a firefighter in the 1970s. Fostered by Lloyd Layman of the U.S. Navy, the concept was that a finely divided stream of water will more readily absorb heat than a straight stream. Therefore, the use of a fog stream for shipboard firefighting in an enclosed steel compartment would produce a more effective attack than would the use of a straight stream. After testing, his theories were proven correct—for shipboard firefighting.

The U.S. fire service then began to adopt this tactic in structural firefighting. Although the concept seemed good, we found out that, in practice, this tactic was not as effective for structural fires as we first thought it would be. In fact, we faced several consequences of the new attack method: steam burns to firefighters and civilians, the spread of fire due to the air in the fog stream and insufficient flows due to the different pressure requirements of the fog stream nozzle. In addition, extinguishment became more difficult when an enclosed area could not be maintained inside the involved structure.

As time went on, we began to discover that the original method of attack with straight streams may have been better after all. This process took years to work itself out in the fire service. The reason it occurred in the first place was because we adopted principles that worked in a particular box but not the overall fire service box. Layman can rightly be credited with thinking outside the box and coming up with a new and valid concept for shipboard firefighting. The rest of us can rightly be blamed for adopting a theory that was untested in our box and, hence, caused unintended negative consequences. If we had tested Layman’s tactics in our own setting, we would have discovered the effect of the fog stream on the spread of the fire and its ineffectiveness in an unconfined space. More importantly, we would have discovered the adverse effect of the superheated steam on the firefighters and civilians who are exposed to in this type of attack. In effect, we failed to consider the weak link (Side No. 6) when we adopted this type of attack.

Example No. 2: New Strategy—The Interior Fire Attack from the Unburned Portion: This concept was holy writ when I started in the fire service. It held two tenants: 1) Take the water to the fire through a faster, more aggressive attack with smaller attack lines; and 2) Enter and attack from the unburned portion of the structure, and drive the fire back into the area that was already burned.

The goal of both tenants was a quick resolution to the fire and property conversation. We still do this as a default attack mode in many areas of the fire service. The problem is that it can lead us to ignore the box in which we work. It takes us into a burning structure that we know will collapse due to fire degradation and gravity. It takes us into a confined space with an uncontrolled fire that we know is an accident waiting to happen. We also know that our bodies are challenged to the max by this type of attack. Furthermore, when something does go wrong, we are often unable to adjust and tragedy occurs.

I’m not espousing that we abandon this attack method entirely. I am simply saying that it stands in opposition to almost all sides of the box (Side Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6), all in an attempt to address only one side of the box (No. 4—fire control). Therefore, this method of attack should be carefully considered and fully justified prior to its use. An alternative, where possible, might be to use an offensive exterior attack with straight streams to break the back of the fire prior to entering the structure. This keeps us outside the confined space and presents an easier and safer initial attack option. Once we have gained the initiative over the fire, we can then evaluate the need and benefit for entering the structure.

Example No. 3—New Technology, PPE & TICs: Great strides have been made in the ability of our turnout gear to protect us from fire, heat and toxic byproducts of combustion. In one example, fire gear was put on a dummy and tested in flashover conditions. The results showed that the integrity of the gear was not significantly compromised. This was amazing in and of itself. The problem: The sensors on the test dummy indicated the dummy probably would not have survived. In another article on a particular type of undergarment, the garments were tested under PPE. It was noted that when the PPE was exposed to flashover or near-flashover conditions, the PPE survived but the undergarment did not. The problem is obvious: If we tout our gear as superior in its ability to resist fire but fail to acknowledge the vulnerability of the firefighter inside, we are asking for trouble. In addition, if we ignore the top and bottom of the box (Sides 1 and 2), then we’ll be inside when the building collapses on us. What benefit is it when we take our fireproof gear inside and then get trapped by falling debris? In our pursuits of better PPE, we fail to acknowledge the rest (especially Side 6) of the box.

Thermal-imaging cameras (TICs) are another example. They were touted as the wonder tool of the fire service. We’d be able to see through walls, floors, doors and read other people’s minds. The problem is that the original TICs were created for a different box than ours. They were designed for the military for use in combat—not an enclosed IDLH environment. We found out in short order that the performance of the TIC was degraded when the ambient heat around us reached a certain level. This was never a problem in open air combat (different box). The picture a TIC produces inside a burning building is often reversed, with the victim appearing cooler than the ambient surroundings. This is the reverse of the military application.

We also found out that just because we could see through the smoke didn’t mean the smoke wasn’t deadly. TICs tempt us to go deeper into the structure—and at a faster pace because of our increased vision. Also, because we can see “through” the smoke, we fail to look at the smoke to see what the smoke is trying to tell us. Furthermore, just because we find the fire faster doesn’t mean we put it out faster. In short, we believe the TIC will do more than it can. TICs have led us to believe we are safe when we are not, that there was not fire when there was, and that finding a problem is the same as solving a problem. Although I agree that TICs are beneficial to the fire service, this is a classic example of thinking outside the box without first addressing the box itself.

When to Think Outside the Box
So when and how do we think outside the box?

When we think outside the box is fairly easy to define. We need to think outside the box when our current practices are ineffective or made obsolete by changes in the environment of our job. New problems may require new solutions. I say “may require” because not all new problems require new solutions. If a new problem can be resolved through a current proven practice, then I believe we should stay with the proven practice. Only when we need new answers do we need to think outside the box. This is going to be a point of contention with many of you. I hope by challenging you with this statement that it opens up sincere conversation on this topic.

The real question is, How do we think outside the box? I believe the answer lies in three steps:

1. Knowing fully what the box entails: We must define what we know to be true and what cannot be denied or ignored. We need to understand all the sides of the box at all times.

2. Define the problem within the full context of the box: I believe this is our first major weakness or failure when we think outside the box. We fail to view the solutions we create in the totality of our performance conditions and requirements. Too often we come up with answers to specific problems that then ignore the overall realities of the rest of the job. Any answer to a problem on the fireground must be applied in the full context of the fireground. If the answer ignores the full extent of the fireground situation and leads us into unsafe practices in an endeavor to solve a specific fireground problem, then our “outside-the-box solution” is no solution at all. It is an invitation to disaster.

3. Test the answer to see if it works inside the box: No challenge, especially in the fire service, can be solved in a vacuum. Because we are so integrated as a team in every operation we perform, any changes to one area of an operation must be viewed for its effect on the whole operation. This is why when we think outside the box to come up with a new solution for a problem or a modification to an existing procedure, we need to test the answer back inside the confines of our operational parameters to see if it actually works. We cannot afford to assume that some new idea works just because it seems good or seems easy. Only by repeatedly field-testing the solution in a safe but realistic training scenario will we be able to say with any confidence that it will work on the fireground. This is especially true for the fire service where operational safety is not just lip service but a matter of great import.

Final Thoughts
In all that I have said, I don’t want you to get the impression that I am against innovation or progress. I am all for it in the context of coming up with reliable, effective, safe fireground answers. However, when thinking “outside the box” is interpreted as experimenting on the fireground to see if an ides works, then we will surely pay the price for such a decision. Why do I say this? Because, historically, those who have thought “outside the box” have failed more often than they have succeeded. This is how innovation works. We call it trial and error, which leads to eventual success. Thomas Edison failed in more than 100 of his attempts to invent the incandescent bulb. This worked for him because the price of failure was insignificant compared to the benefit of success. This is not the case in the fire service. If we as a fire service experiment with untested ideas on the fireground, we are, in effect, applying bad tactics or strategies. And we know that if we apply bad tactics or untested ideas on the fireground, we will eventually pay the price. This is why I have hesitations with the idea of thinking outside the box.

In conclusion, let’s remember that what we do is extremely dangerous. When we use innovation to enhance our performance, we must do it in the totality of our performance parameters (the box) and only after we are certain it is safe.

Jim Baird is a 31-year veteran of the fire service. He is currently the chief of the Brunswick (Ohio) Fire Department and also serves as a fire instructor for the Cuyahoga Community College Fire Training Academy. His first career was with the City of Mesa (Ariz.) Fire Department, where he served for 20 years as a fire medic and engine company officer.

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