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Houston Report Finds Errors in 2009 Death of Captain, Firefighter
JAMES PINKERTON
Houston Chronicle
Reprinted with Permission
The failure to fully assess a burning home and then entering the smoky blaze without two-way radios or thermal imaging equipment may have contributed to the deaths of a veteran Houston Fire Department captain and a rookie firefighter battling a wind-whipped house fire last Easter, according to an investigation by the State fire marshal's office.
Read the Report
Firefighter Fatality Investigation - Investigation Number FY 09-01
The bodies of Capt. James A. Harlow, 50, and firefighter Damion J. Hobbs, 29, were recovered inside 7811 Oak Vista about 40 minutes after firetrucks first arrived at the southeast Houston residence last April 12. Harlow and Hobbs' engine truck was the first on the scene, at about 12:07 a.m., and the two, along with a third firefighter, mounted a “fast attack,“ entering the empty home where a fire fueled by 30 mph wind gusts was intensified by the collapse of a large glass wall at the rear of the house.
An elderly couple that lived in the home already had left, after seeing smoke and fire coming from a bedroom closet. Arson investigators later blamed the blaze on a loose electrical connection in a light fixture.
“There were several factors that, when combined, may have contributed to the deaths of Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs,“ concludes a 47-page report compiled by the state fire marshal, which made six findings. “It is important that we honor them by learning from the incident.”
Acting Houston Fire Chief Rick Flanagan on Monday would not comment on fire marshal's report, saying he has read only excerpts from the review, which was posted online. Later Monday, Flanagan released the Houston Fire Department's own internal review of the fire.
“Our report, basically, says that the officers, from the team perspective, did everything according to our guidelines to address this fire,“ Flanagan said.
Chief backs firefighters
The chief defended firefighters' actions and said no disciplinary action was contemplated against any firefighter on the call.
The HFD report raised three of the six issues discussed in the fire marshal's review.
HFD and the fire marshal's reports note that firefighters did not do a complete assessment of the fire or cut off utilities before entering the dwelling.
As a result, firefighters did not see a large glass wall at the rear that later collapsed and allowed strong winds to fan the flames.
“A rapid and full assessment of the scene would have provided information regarding the potential impact of the large glass wall, together with the impact of wind, on the interior suppression tactics,“ the fire marshal report states.
According to both reports, the HFD commander on the scene tried to contact Harlow and Hobbs by radio, but Harlow had left his two-way radio in the engine truck and Hobbs' radio was found turned off and tuned to a different channel.
The two reports also note that a thermal imaging camera was not taken inside the residence by Harlow's crew to help gauge the intensity of the fire.
Separated during fire
The fire marshal's report also cited the location of a ventilation hole punched in the roof by firefighters on a ladder truck, saying it put Harlow and Hobbs between the fire and the exiting air.
The fire marshal's report further noted Hobbs and Harlow became separated from their fire hose, which was their only guide out of the smoky, burning home. It also stated the two firefighters were standing as they battled the fire, instead of crouching to avoid the intense heat.
Flanagan said he would not “speculate” if different decisions would have saved the two firefighters' lives.
“I don't want to second-guess the officers, because I wasn't there. I know the things they did at this fire were according to our guidelines,“ Flanagan said. “The officer has to make his decision once he does his size-up. The size-up was done. Now, he didn't do the full 360 degrees that would have given more and full information to make a better decision.”
Jeff Caynon, president of the Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association, said he had not seen either report.
“No fire is exactly the same,“ Caynon said. “No checklist is going to completely prepare you for the complex nature of the fire ground.”
Use of radios stressed
HFD's 20-page report of the fire makes 21 “quality assurance findings“ and includes a time line of the actions taken during the fire.
The HFD report noted fire officials in command controlled the fire, and after discovering Harlow and Hobbs had not responded to calls quickly sent a team to enter the home and find them.
The use of radios at fire scenes should be reinforced by training and practice, according to the HFD report. It also recommended firefighters enter a structure in a low stance to enhance their chance of survival.
Harlow's entry team at first was made up of three firefighters, but one had to leave because of a helmet malfunction.
HFD's report said the entire team should have left the burning house until the equipment was fixed.
The blaze remains under investigation by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, which reviews all line-of-duty firefighter deaths.
james.pinkerton@chron.com
Houston Chronicle
Reprinted with Permission
The failure to fully assess a burning home and then entering the smoky blaze without two-way radios or thermal imaging equipment may have contributed to the deaths of a veteran Houston Fire Department captain and a rookie firefighter battling a wind-whipped house fire last Easter, according to an investigation by the State fire marshal's office.
Read the Report
Firefighter Fatality Investigation - Investigation Number FY 09-01
An elderly couple that lived in the home already had left, after seeing smoke and fire coming from a bedroom closet. Arson investigators later blamed the blaze on a loose electrical connection in a light fixture.
“There were several factors that, when combined, may have contributed to the deaths of Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs,“ concludes a 47-page report compiled by the state fire marshal, which made six findings. “It is important that we honor them by learning from the incident.”
Acting Houston Fire Chief Rick Flanagan on Monday would not comment on fire marshal's report, saying he has read only excerpts from the review, which was posted online. Later Monday, Flanagan released the Houston Fire Department's own internal review of the fire.
“Our report, basically, says that the officers, from the team perspective, did everything according to our guidelines to address this fire,“ Flanagan said.
Chief backs firefighters
The chief defended firefighters' actions and said no disciplinary action was contemplated against any firefighter on the call.
The HFD report raised three of the six issues discussed in the fire marshal's review.
HFD and the fire marshal's reports note that firefighters did not do a complete assessment of the fire or cut off utilities before entering the dwelling.
As a result, firefighters did not see a large glass wall at the rear that later collapsed and allowed strong winds to fan the flames.
“A rapid and full assessment of the scene would have provided information regarding the potential impact of the large glass wall, together with the impact of wind, on the interior suppression tactics,“ the fire marshal report states.
According to both reports, the HFD commander on the scene tried to contact Harlow and Hobbs by radio, but Harlow had left his two-way radio in the engine truck and Hobbs' radio was found turned off and tuned to a different channel.
The two reports also note that a thermal imaging camera was not taken inside the residence by Harlow's crew to help gauge the intensity of the fire.
Separated during fire
The fire marshal's report also cited the location of a ventilation hole punched in the roof by firefighters on a ladder truck, saying it put Harlow and Hobbs between the fire and the exiting air.
The fire marshal's report further noted Hobbs and Harlow became separated from their fire hose, which was their only guide out of the smoky, burning home. It also stated the two firefighters were standing as they battled the fire, instead of crouching to avoid the intense heat.
Flanagan said he would not “speculate” if different decisions would have saved the two firefighters' lives.
“I don't want to second-guess the officers, because I wasn't there. I know the things they did at this fire were according to our guidelines,“ Flanagan said. “The officer has to make his decision once he does his size-up. The size-up was done. Now, he didn't do the full 360 degrees that would have given more and full information to make a better decision.”
Jeff Caynon, president of the Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association, said he had not seen either report.
“No fire is exactly the same,“ Caynon said. “No checklist is going to completely prepare you for the complex nature of the fire ground.”
Use of radios stressed
HFD's 20-page report of the fire makes 21 “quality assurance findings“ and includes a time line of the actions taken during the fire.
The HFD report noted fire officials in command controlled the fire, and after discovering Harlow and Hobbs had not responded to calls quickly sent a team to enter the home and find them.
The use of radios at fire scenes should be reinforced by training and practice, according to the HFD report. It also recommended firefighters enter a structure in a low stance to enhance their chance of survival.
Harlow's entry team at first was made up of three firefighters, but one had to leave because of a helmet malfunction.
HFD's report said the entire team should have left the burning house until the equipment was fixed.
The blaze remains under investigation by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, which reviews all line-of-duty firefighter deaths.
james.pinkerton@chron.com
Replies to This Discussion
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Permalink Reply by Joseph McMahon on
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“It is important that we honor them by learning from the incident.”
I think that says it all…
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Permalink Reply by Diana Pagnotta on
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You're right. That's all that needs to be said.
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Permalink Reply by Jonathan Pease on
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One of the best things to take out of this tragic event is to remember the risk verse benefit of a structure. If everyone is out, what are you looking to save verse the risk that you are going to be putting yourself and other in.
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Permalink Reply by ROBERT L CARLBERG on
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I also agree we should learn and honor are fallen and if we know structures or free of Victim and are fully involved life and lime come before propriety
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Permalink Reply by Scott Climer on
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I'm in total agreement with you, Jon. There was an incident here in Charlotte several years ago that ultimately/later resulted in a FF death, when the floor collapsed beneath him inside a burning residential structure. It has been speculated that a simple, ONE MINUTE walk-around of the structure before entering would have very likely changed their plan of attack, or at least delayed their interior attack, and the FF would not have died needlessly. I say this not to show fault, but to serve as yet ANOTHER eye-opener to what can happen on a SEEMIGLY simple and low-hazard scene.
Having 32 years experience in the fire service, and having served as a company officer, I would ALWAYS do a walk-around before allowing ANY of my guys go charging into a well-involved fire. The ONLY exception being if we KNEW there was an IMMEDIATE life-threat inside the building (not just a speculated one). I know it's hard to judge when you're not on the scene in situations like this, but like you, I feel there is at least ONE thing we can learn from it... 1)STOP! 2) Take a deep breath 3) ASSESS the immediate life risks of BOTH potential victims AND your crew. 4) If the life-risk to victims is IMMEDIATE and EMERGENT A N D a reasonably safe rescue can be performed, then by all means DO IT! 5) If there are no KNOWN immediate life risks to victims, and a rescue CANNOT be safely made (within reason), you should DELAY entrance into the structure until a time when it CAN be made safely.
It's such a shame that so many firefighters get tunnel vision and have the "CHARGE ON IN" mindset. This results in NUMEROUS, unneeded/unjustified firefighter deaths.
That's just my two cents worth...
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It's refreshing and somewhat reassuring to hear more firefighters are realizing they need to "assess risks before committing."
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Permalink Reply by Marilee Thomas on
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REST IN PEACE BROTHER'S. I do agree with a comment below, if you know for sure everyone is out why go inside and risk your life until you know it is safe to do so. I was taught on my Level 1 that our safety is put above all else, if we go down that means risking more lives, we need to learn from others mistakes and stay safe on scene.
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*Applauds!*
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Permalink Reply by John Rulli Jr. on
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agreed
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Permalink Reply by Mark on
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I agree, assessing is very important. At least one of them should have had a radio. The camera though? They weren't looking for fire in a wall or a victim. I think we're adding too many components for safety. I mean the orange road vests now? If a person can't see the big red truckw/the flashing lights, an orange road vest won't make the difference. All these rules (ie:what you must carry) will some day, encourage a city/municipality to deny benefits to someone because it was "their fault" for not having ALL of the equipment provided.
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Permalink Reply by bryce riddell on
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My heart aches for these men and the Houston Department. I am sick and tired of people saying: we support the actions of our firefighters. They followed dept policy. "did it by the book." THEN CHANGE THE DAMN BOOK.
3 things that kill firefighters: 1 fire above, 2 fire below, 3 hostile fire event. I would argue #4 is QUICK ATTACK.
Why do we continue to think that we need to mingle with the fire trying to put it out. Put large amounts of water on it from an exterior position to make it safe to go in.
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Very well put, Bryce...
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