Two Firefighter Deaths Highlight the Need for Rehab
Story & Photos by Jeffrey T. Lindsey

Training is an integral part of the fire service. Senior firefighters and company officers conduct training exercises and drill every day throughout the country. But whether it’s initial training or station drills, the risk of injury or death is always present.

Cases in point: On May 31, 2008, a firefighter recruit died after a day of final testing for certification as a firefighter in Oklahoma. On Nov. 9, 2008, a firefighter died while participating in a maze drill in Virginia. These two cases are reflective of concerns the fire service faces in the realm of training.

In this article, I’ll look at these two incidents more closely and offer advice on what you can do to prevent these tragic events from occurring in the future.

Stillwater, OK
The following is a recount of the event as described in the investigation final report by the Oklahoma State University Fire Service Training:

On May 31, 2008, a group 15 recruits from various fire departments around Oklahoma met at the Oklahoma State University Fire Service Training grounds to complete their training program. One of the trainees, firefighter Russell “Rusty” Toppings, was a 28-year-old Caucasian male who stood 6 feet tall and weighed approximately 280 lbs. He served as a volunteer firefighter with the Barnsdall Rural Volunteer Fire Department, and was considered one of best, most enthusiastic and fittest students in the class.

The testing conducted that day was long and strenuous, but consistent with most certification sessions. Conditions were ideal. It was 75 degrees out, with 69 percent relative humidity and a light breeze at 8 mph. Participants were urged to hydrate and dress comfortably.

Prior to the testing process, each participant was required to complete a medical information form. Toppings noted ulcerative colitis on his information form, but failed to note that he had been having flare-ups of the condition for the past 2 days.

The event orientation emphasized the need to hydrate throughout the day; the location of the water coolers and Gatorade coolers was noted. Further, instructors informed the participants of the statistics involved with the class, emphasizing that in virtually every class, two students were transported to the local hospital as result of dehydration.

The testing began. As the day progressed, various recruits were overcome with heat exhaustion. By 1100 HRS, one firefighter was transported to the hospital for heat exhaustion. One possible reason for the occurrence of this condition could be the fact that firefighters participating in this type of training push themselves more so than in other classes, since unsuccessful completion requires that they repeat the program; however, the instructors do not recall expressing this to the students.

A variety of evolutions was conducted throughout the morning, with participants in full PPE. Lunchtime ran over an hour long, and during that time, Toppings was found to be in good physical condition other than sweating profusely.

By the afternoon, the temperature had risen to 85 degrees with 65 percent humidity, wind at 15 mph and scattered clouds. Around 1500 HRS, the temperature reached a high of 91 degrees. The trainees performed a series of evolutions, but rehab was provided at various times, and students were instructed to notify the instructors if they needed a break.

Students didn’t remove PPE in between evolutions, and in some cases, they went from one role to another. By the end of the day, Toppings didn’t voice any complaints, and at one point, he noted how much he enjoyed the day. Toppings worked digging ditches all day and was accustomed to performing manual labor in the heat.

As the last evolution was completed somewhere around 1810 HRS, a couple firefighters were in the bathroom and noticed a set of bunker boots in one of the bathroom stalls. Nothing seemed to be out of the ordinary. At 1815 HRS, one of the instructors checked the buildings to begin locking up the facility when he too noticed the boots and investigated. At this time, Toppings was discovered unresponsive in the toilet stall. He was removed and medical care was initiated, with AED advising no shock indicated. He was transported to the hospital and was pronounced dead at 1911 HRS.

A formal investigation was conducted with 23 findings to address. Twenty recommendations were made as a result of this investigation; six involved live-fire training while the remaining 14 focused on rehab during live-fire training.

Woodbridge, VA
Six months later in Prince William County, Va., a 42-year-old firefighter suffered a sudden cardiac death during maze training. The following is a recount of the event from the NIOSH report. (Similar to the previous event, the firefighter trainee was going through an all-day training event involving the SCBA maze.)

There was no live fire during the training; however, participants were in PPE most of the day, with brief breaks in between evolutions. The trainee in this situation was going through the maze mid-afternoon when communication with her was suddenly lost. It took approximately 10 minutes to extricate her from the maze and begin medical intervention. She was in cardiac arrest. The trainee had complained of not feeling well prior to the event; however, she elected to continue with the training.

The recommendations from the NIOSH investigation focused on the need for proper rehab during the training event.

The Solution

The common problem shared by these two incidents: the lack of adequate rehab for firefighters during training.