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Put to the Test: 6-alarm fire stresses need for command, control, preparation
Put to the Test: A 6-alarm fire reveals the importance of command, control & preparation
By Deputy Assistant Chief Robert Maynes
The fire service believes size-up or situational awareness begins long before your arrival on the fireground; it can start with the receipt of the alarm or with your commute to the firehouse. Size-up is an integral part of acquiring accurate situational awareness. (Situational awareness is simply defined as what you think is happening compared to what’s actually happening.)
Feb. 3, 2007, was a seasonably cold and clear winter day. The weather forecast for the night tour indicated there would be a severe drop in temperature with increased winds, including gusts of 40 mph. The combination of a busy 0900 x 1800 tour and the ominous forecast inspired a determined size-up for the night tour. Additionally, local units were experiencing a busy day tour, including a fire in a multiple dwelling for which companies prepared to perform a life-saving rope rescue.
Shortly before midnight on Feb. 3, Battalion 47 and Division 13 would experience a complex multiple-dwelling fire including numerous “incidents within an incident” in a six-story, non-fireproof, H-type apartment building. At the conclusion, six full alarms would be utilized and the occupants of 58 apartments would require relocation. This incident tested the limits of FDNY’s level of preparation and served up some valuable lessons about command and discipline on the fireground.
Getting There
At 2346 HRS, an alarm was transmitted for the report of a structural fire in a fifth-floor apartment at 1056 Neilson Street in Far Rockaway, Queens. Neilson Street is less than a half-mile west of the Nassau County border. All resources assigned would need to travel from the West or from a circuitous northern route through Nassau County, which would mean a lengthy response time for all but the eastern Battalion 47 companies.
It’s standard procedure for battalion chief (BC) Timothy Joyce in Battalion 47 to request additional assistance in a proactive manner, and he did; however, due to the lengthy response time, the second-assigned BC (Battalion 54, all-hands chief) was delayed.
Division 13 traveled 9.92 miles from their quarters in Richmond Hills, Queens, to 1056 Neilson Street; however, due to city streets with numerous traffic signals, it took 26 minutes for Division 13 to arrive on scene. Squad 270, which shares its quarters with Division 13, was the first-assigned special operations company.
Upon Arrival
Engine 328 (E 328) and Ladder 134 (L 134) arrived first, but saw no fire or smoke showing on the exterior. L 134 positioned its aerial ladder, but discovered it couldn’t be used above the fourth floor due to overhead electrical wires.
A full alarm was dispatched by the Queens Communication Center based on the report of a trapped child on the sixth floor. Squad 270 was included as an additional unit, along with Division 13, which requested to be assigned to the response. Upon arrival, units discovered a smoke and heat condition on the fifth floor in the B wing. E 328 stretched a handline via the main entrance and interior stairs to apartment 5H.
Search & Rescue
The members of Ladder 121 (L 121), the second-due truck, proceeded to the sixth floor to initiate ventilation, entry and search of the apartments above the fire. L 121 forced entry to apartment 6H and were met by a panicked family trapped in a smoke-filled apartment. The family was directed to safety, while Lt. Steven Sharp rescued Chanise McMillan, a three-year-old female.
E 328 stretched their line to a closet in apartment 5H and extinguished all visible fire. Squad 270 arrived at the building shortly thereafter. Fire and smoke were still not visible from the street.
The roof teams from L 134 and L 121 initiated roof ventilation. Immediately after venting the two bulkheads, firefighters discovered an adult male in apartment 6E at the window in distress.
Apartment 6E is a rear throat apartment without a fire escape but with an exit door to each wing of the building. (Note: A throat apartment is the apartment in the hall between the two wings.) If a fire door is present in the throat, a fire escape isn’t required providing there’s egress to both sides of the fire door. The occupants were using only the B-wing exit; heavy furniture covered the A-wing exit, limiting the occupants to one means of egress.
The roof team was quickly augmented by members of Squad 270, as firefighters prepared to perform a life-saving rope rescue from the roof to apartment 6E. Firefighters then transmitted their intent to perform the rescue over fireground communications.
The rescue delayed additional roof ventilation, which at this time warranted the cutting of a ventilation hole and a trench cut between the two wings; however, the roof team made the right decision by prioritizing a known life hazard before executing roof-cutting operations.
A Change in Tactics
BC Joyce was now present on the sixth floor and had already transmitted an all-hands and a request for an additional engine and ladder company. Based on the conditions in the sixth-floor hallway, Joyce determined that a rescue from the interior could be accomplished and would be safer than the rope rescue. As a result, he broadcast the cancellation of the roof rescue and directed the rescue from the interior.
Firefighter Brian Copper, Squad 270, and Captain Fred Marsilla, L 134, worked as a team to successfully force the door of Apartment 6E. They then located the victim, first with a thermal imaging camera (TIC) and then with a diligent search. Crews removed the victim, Leroy Ellis, who was now unconscious, from the apartment to the public hall and down the interior stairs of the A-wing.
Deteriorating Conditions
Five minutes after the arrival of Squad 270, the situation changed dramatically. At this time, conditions in the B wing were seriously deteriorating, with high heat and smoke on the sixth floor. The geographical distance additional companies had to travel, sub-freezing temperatures, gusting winds and an advanced fire in the cockloft were all having a significant, negative impact on the operation.
Fire was now visible from the exposure 1 street in three apartments on two floors. From the command post, extending fire was observed as flames appeared in the B wing windows of exposure 1 and moved through the throat. It continued on to A-wing apartments. A serious fire condition in the cockloft extended over all sixth-floor apartments via channel rails to out-of-the-ordinary areas on random floors, including fire venting on the second floor in the “A” wing.
Due to intense heat on the roof, all ventilation attempts were abandoned. The challenge at this time was to address life hazards in an occupied building with fire conditions similar to a vacant building, all while the on-scene units awaited second- and third-alarm units, many of which had to travel more than 7 miles. The situation required numerous additional 2 1/2" handlines and tower ladders to knock down the expanding fire.
From Bad to Worse
Individual members were transmitting urgent radio transmissions for extending fire at an estimated pace of eight transmissions per minute. Individuals continued to disrupt urgent transmissions before completion, resulting in additional confusion and unheard transmissions. Example: Captain Marsilla transmitted a 10-45 signal (victim with a life-threatening injury), but it was blocked out by numerous transmissions deemed urgent reporting rapidly extending fire.
Search teams had completed all searches on the sixth floor with the exception of one room in apartment 6G. The unsearched bedroom was located in exposure 1 and 4 corner of the building. The ladder members determined that the room had no fire escape and couldn’t be reached by ladders. In addition, the members concluded that breaching the wall wasn’t an option due to the presence of kitchen cabinets.
Four individuals of the ladder company feared that occupants were still present in apartment 6G, so they decided to make a quick entry, complete a primary search and quickly exit. Upon entering the corner room, gusts of wind intensified the smoke and heat conditions. Members searched to the exposure 4-corner window and after a quick size-up, decided to attempt exit via the windows, possibly using their personal safety systems if warranted.
Firefighter Mark Barret, Ladder 165 (L 165), notified the interior members that he could maneuver L 134’s aerial to the window. Barret mounted the turntable and raised the aerial ladder, making contact with the live wires, producing an arc that de-energized power. Barret maneuvered the aerial, and the members of L 121 exited the corner room via the aerial ladder. A subsequent roll-call confirmed that all members were accounted for.
Escalating Response
Assistant Chief Thomas Galvin, the citywide command chief, arrived on scene approximately 60 minutes into the operation and was informed that all members were accounted for and that all reported trapped civilians had been successfully removed or rescued. Shortly thereafter, Chief Galvin took over command while I assumed the operations section chief assignment. Fire then became visible from the command post in the throat area on the second, third and fourth floors. As a result, Chief Galvin ordered a fourth alarm at 0046 HRS, followed by a fifth alarm at 0103 HRS and a sixth alarm at 0230 HRS.
BCs Joyce, Boyce, Carlson and Rasweiller were now assigned specific floors to complete tactical secondary searches and extinguish fire. Tower Ladder Company 155 (TL 155) applied water to the sixth floor from a position in the front throat area, which delayed fire spread in the throat area, but the ladder couldn’t reach all areas. Eventually, three tower ladders were used simultaneously, applying water to exposures 1, 2 and 3. Firefighters used exterior handlines to apply water from the roof of the exposure 4 building onto the fire building roof and top floors.
Taken by Surprise
Shortly after Chief Galvin’s arrival, a localized collapse of an area approximately 20 x 20 started on the sixth floor and pancaked down to the second floor, and was eventually stopped by the ceiling area of the lobby. The collapse prohibited any tactic involving members in the lobby or using the main entrance.
Supervisors were surprised by the collapse. All involved chief officers had not previously experienced such collapses in complex fires in similar construction. Subsequent investigations determined that during the original construction, a second elevator or similar shaft-type addition was abandoned. The area was valuable rentable space, and was therefore converted into a unit with substandard joists. Once the sixth floor collapsed into the fifth floor, the increased weight caused subsequent pancake-type collapses, with the lobby supporting the load.
Later visits to the building revealed that the shaft acted like a chimney with minimal scorching evident on the shaft bricks. The 20 x 20 area caused an intense fire with the majority of the fire on the second, third, and fourth floors limited to the shaft area. Serious injury was only prevented because no units were assigned to the shaft area at the time of collapse.
Incident Conclusion
At 0400 HRS on Feb. 4, occupants of 1045 Neilson Street were accounted for. Chanise McMillan was treated for minor injuries; Leroy Ellis was transported to the hyperbaric chamber with serious injuries, but was released from the hospital after 5 days of treatment. Numerous FDNY members were treated at area hospitals for minor injuries. At sunrise, most visible fire was knocked down; operations continued until 0100 HRS on Feb. 5.
More than 300 FDNY members and 51 units operated at this incident. At the time of the fire, 53 of the 58 apartments in the fire building were occupied by 214 individuals. All occupants required relocation following the fire, which was determined to be an intentionally set fire that started in a closet and rapidly extended to the cockloft via a void created for a soil pipe.
Lessons Learned
This incident served up several lessons that are valuable for any department operating at a major fire.
Radio Discipline
At recent complex operations, fireground communication discipline has proven less than sufficient. As this incident illustrates, individuals continue to interrupt critical transmissions with insignificant transmissions. Based on a review of the radio communication recordings retrieved from Battalion 51, more than 30 minutes after the initial signal that companies had arrived on scene, 19 urgent radio transmissions were broadcast. In all 19 urgent transmissions, the original exchange of information was interrupted by a new radio transmission. Other important transmissions, including the one regarding evacuation of members from the 6th floor, were disrupted.
I estimate approximately 60 urgent transmissions reporting extending fire, which was unnecessary because the rapidly extending fire was evident to all chief officers on the fireground. Three attempts to instill radio discipline by using an emergency override that increases radio power to five watts were interrupted within 30 seconds. Active listening to the radio to attain situational awareness was minimal.
We must consider a system that includes a manageable span of control. Unwarranted radio transmissions add to the complexity of the operation, therefore individuals must be disciplined, especially during complex operations. Military line units exercise span-of-control on radios, similar to the 5/1 ratio of span-of-control found in the incident command system. When an urgent or mayday transmission has been broadcast, radio utilization must be limited to equally important communications.
At the Neilson Street Fire, an estimated 215 radios were dedicated to tactical channel 1 because it was determined that all units operating inside the building would need to monitor the channel to receive any critical information that would impact their safety or assignment. At multiple alarms, however, incident commanders should consider additional tactical channels if the incident and safety permit. When using the command channel, it’s imperative that chiefs operate with the ability to monitor both the command and tactical channels.
Risk Assessment
The ladder company that searched the final bedroom, resulting in their need to be rescued, determined that a victim could be present in the corner bedroom, and conditions permitted entry and search. Additionally, the completion of a primary search in the bedroom would complete the primary search assignment for the apartment. The search team entered the bedroom and initiated a search when the wind gusted, resulting in a significant change in the corner bedroom.
One of the firefighters’ vibra alerts sounded and the search team searched toward the exposure 4 windows, completing the primary search. At that time, the team determined that the heat condition prevented a quick exit via the interior. The firefighters communicated the procedure for using their personal safety systems if required. Fortunately, Barrett’s actions negated the need for using the systems.
When making a decision to perform an assignment that requires unusual risk, the reward must be considered. Supervisors are required to size up and make quick decisions based on confirmed life hazards. Confirmation of a life hazard requires a visual or audio confirmation. A life hazard reported by civilians is often inaccurate.
Roof Operations
The firefighters initially conducting roof operations were confronted with complex issues: immediate venting of the bulkhead, cutting of ventilation holes, cutting a trench and a life-saving rope rescue due to the confirmed presence of a life hazard in apartment 6E. At structural fires with complex roof operations, ICs should consider assigning a chief officer to supervise the roof sector as soon as possible. By assigning a chief officer to complex roof operations, span-of-control is increased, as is overall safety and the effectiveness of operations. When complex roof operations are required, the incident commander should consider assigning a chief officer as the roof division supervisor. The supervisor brings additional experience, supervision and accountability.
Fires in Closets
In non-fireproof multiple dwellings, suspect the possibility of voids and channel rails behind closets, kitchen walls, bathroom walls and boxed-out areas. This fire was intentionally started in a closet. A void behind the closet wall provided a flue to the cockloft. Before the first units arrived, the fire had extended from the fifth-floor closet to the cockloft. The extreme cold and gusting winds accelerated the spread of the cockloft fire.
Whenever a fire impacts any suspected void area, immediately inspect areas above the fire, particularly the top floor and cockloft. The TIC is a tremendous asset while conducting these inspections, but it shouldn’t replace inspection holes or other examinations where required.
Remote Locations
In areas similar to Far Rockaway, initial incident commanders must recognize the potential for an expanding operation and transmit additional alarms early in the operation. In Far Rockaway, all assistance responds from the West, which results in longer response times for multiple-alarm units. Incident commanders in remote locations must be proactive and transmit radio signals early. Early requests for additional alarms were transmitted at the Neilson Street Fire, but they did not sufficiently address long responses.
Conclusion
On Feb. 3, FDNY units encountered a complex fire that tested preparedness and procedures. Due to the professional operation by all assigned resources the loss of life was eliminated and injuries were minimized. Training, preparedness, discipline, and commitment are all essential when assigned to complex operations.
Bob Maynes is a Deputy Assistant Chief assigned as the FDNY’s Chief of Planning & Strategy. In 2007 he was assigned to Division-13 as a Deputy Chief He responded to the 1993 WTC bombing as an engine company officer, to the 9/11 WTC rescue and recovery as a battalion commander and to the initial FDNY incident management team (IMT) response as an Operations Section Chief to support the New Orleans Fire Department after Hurricane Katrina.
Maynes is a nationally qualified Type 1 Operations Section Chief, a nationally qualified Type-II Incident Commander and a nationally qualified Liaison Officer. He serves as FDNY’s IMT Incident Commander and liaison to external agencies.
Copyright © Elsevier Inc., a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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