Meridian Plaza Fire: Would Your Department Be Prepared?

20 years ago, 3 firefighters lost their lives battling a fierce high-rise fire

On Feb. 23, 1991, a pile of rags ignited a fire in a high-rise building under construction in Philadelphia. Three firefighters were killed when they became disoriented in the thick smoke and ran out of air. The fire caused an estimated $100 million in direct property loss.

Exterior view of One Meridian Plaza and fireground operations
in the early morning hours of Feb. 24, 1991. Fire involves
the 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and part of the 25th floors. Note the
heavy stream played on the exterior from an adjacent building. Photo courtesy USFA/Philadelphia Inquirer, Michael S. Wirtz

Aerial view of exterior firefighting operations after dawn on Feb. 24, 1991. Photo courtesy USFA/Philadelphia Inquirer, Michael Mally

View of deluge set operating from One Centre Square. Photo courtesy USFA/Philadelphia Inquirer, Michael Mally


The Fallen
  • Captain David P. Holcombe, age 52
  • Firefighter Phyllis McAllister, age 43
  • Firefighter James A. Chappell, age 29

Other Resources

Although building codes have since improved fire protection in high rises, the One Meridian Plaza fire was the result of a combination of many factors that led to the fire getting out of control. In its report on the fire, the USFA noted, “The most significant new information from this fire relates to the vulnerability of the systems that were installed to provide electrical power and to support fire suppression efforts. In this incident there was an early loss of normal electrical power, a failure of the emergency generator and a major problem with the standpipe system, each of which contributed to the final outcome. These experiences should cause responsible individuals and agencies to critically re-examine the adequacy of all emergency systems in major buildings.”

The bottom line: Even with modern construction and revised building codes, fire departments must be aggressive with preplanning, training and education to ensure that a similar tragedy doesn’t happen again.  

The Incident
The following account is taken from the USFA’s Technical Report Series report on the fire. Additional information was taken from Wikipedia.

The fire began on the 22nd floor of the One Meridian Plaza building around 2023 HRS when linseed-oil-soaked rags left by construction workers ignited and set fire to other solvents nearby. There were only three people in the building at the time. Smoke detectors did not cover the entire floor and by the time the fire alarm went off the fire was already well established.

The lobby guard returned a call to the alarm-monitoring service that had called when the alarm initially went off to confirm that there was a fire, but did not call the Philadelphia Fire Department (PFD). The first call came from someone on the street who saw smoke coming from the building, and shortly thereafter the alarm-monitoring service also called the PFD to report the fire.

The fire department arrived to find a well-developed fire on the 22nd floor, with fire dropping down to the 21st floor through a set of convenience stairs. Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and the floors immediately above the 22nd. Crews were instructed to take the low-rise elevators to the 11th floor and walk up from there. By the time they reached the 11th floor, the building had lost power after the heat from the blaze damaged electrical cables. Despite efforts to restore power, the building was without electricity for the entirety of the event. This forced firefighters to work in darkness and without the aid of elevators.

Firefighters were again hampered when it was discovered the pressure release valves (PRVs) on the standpipes were improperly adjusted, giving less than 60-psi discharge pressure, which was not sufficient to fight the fire. It was several hours into the fire before a technician who could adjust the valves arrived at the scene.

Engine 11 was assigned to attempt to ventilate the stairways at the roof level. A captain and two firefighters from Engine 11 started up the center stair from the 22nd floor, but later radioed that they had left the stairway and were disoriented in heavy smoke on the 30th floor.

Shortly thereafter Engine 11’s Captain requested permission to break a window for ventilation. This was followed moments later by a message from a crewmember of Engine 11 reporting that “the captain is down.” Command approved breaking the window. Search teams were sent from below and a helicopter was requested to land a team on the roof. The search teams were able to reach the 30th floor, which was enveloped in heavy smoke, but were unable to find the missing firefighters. They then searched the floors above without success. An eight-member search team became disoriented and ran out of air on the 38th floor but were rescued by the team that had landed on the roof.

Engine 11’s crew was later found on the 28th floor. At the time of their deaths, the 28th floor was not burning but had an extremely heavy smoke condition

By 0700 HRS, firefighters were able to get control of the fire on the 22nd through 24th floors, but the fire was still out of control on the 25th and 26th floors and was spreading upwards. Structural damage observed inside the building led to fears that the damaged floors might collapse. Fire Commissioner Roger Ulshafer issued an order to evacuate the building. The fire ultimately spread to the 30th floor, where it was stopped by 10 automatic sprinklers.

In addition to the three fatalities, the fire injured 24 firefighters. The 12 alarms brought 51 engine companies, 15 ladder companies, 11 specialized units, and more than 300 firefighters to the scene.

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Comment by Rescue1 on February 23, 2011 at 6:35pm
This was a terrible tragedy and we will never forget those lost, 3 Firefighters, countless injuries, over 100 million in property damage and over 4 Billion in civil damages. 11 hours and interior firefighting operations abandoned with no option for and exterior attack!

Unfortunately, these types of incidents help us to recognize the need for new ordinances and innovative techniques to battle these blazes. After 20 years, these High-Risk; Low Frequency- events still occur worldwide and yet we are still trying to battle these dragons with hand lines through wind driven temperatures exceeding 2000° F.

WOULD YOUR DEPARTMENT BE PREPARTED FOR THE NEXT MAJOR HIGH-RISE FIRE?

There is finally a game changer for battling these extreme incidents at any floor height.

A new innovative award winning technology recently available can now help us to control and extinguish these incidents within the first hour while protecting our own, civilian lives and saving billions in property damage from just one fire.

Check out the links below of the remote controlled nozzle testing of The Heropipe System developed in Chicago. Recent testing with FDNY conducted a timed set up from the exterior of the building until 80 PSI nozzle pressure was reached with the maximum GPM in an impressive 3:40 without any previous training. It is capable of delivering the maximum GPM at 80 PSI out of one standpipe discharge from the safety of the floor below with 2 systems operational from each standpipe. Introduce class “A” foam if desired.

Complete battery operated control from the floor below with the Elkhart Sidewinder EXM. Direct your stream with the Thermal Imaging system mounted to the nozzle always viewing the direction of the water stream from a 15” monitor on the floor below. Those images can also be sent to the command center on ground level and forwarded to the OEMC for a live view of the fire attack.

This is the only exterior high-rise, large volume, exterior attack system

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