Letter to the Editor

Editor's note: This letter is in response to the article "Come Up for Air: Exit the building before the low-air alarm activa... (FireRescue, July 2009, p. 66). Chief Morris' response follows the letter.


I would like to respond to the article “Come up for Air” in the July 2009 FireRescue magazine. The author, Chief Gary Morris (ret.) makes some good points and may have identified a safety problem; however I see some difficulties with the solution.

He infers that if we train firefighters in an air management program to leave the IDLH environment before the low-air alarm activates, we could have saved many if not all of the tragic firefighter fatalities noted in the article. For the record, this is NOT a requirement of NFPA 1404. It is part of the Appendix material and therefore for “informational purposes only.”

I would like comment about their assertions of the causes of firefighter deaths in the examples he references. First, my experience in investigating firefighter deaths is limited, but comprehensive, to four incidents as follows:
-Firefighter Dies in House Fire (Prince Georges County, Maryland) 1992
-Three Firefighters Die in Pittsburgh House Fire 1995
-Four Firefighters Die in Seattle Warehouse Fire (Pang) 1995
-Two Firefighters Die in Training Exercise (Osceola County, Florida) 2002
In my opinion, the major cause of these firefighter deaths and those mention in the article, was not their SCBA or lack of a policy that would encourage firefighters to leave before the low-air alarm activates.

Also, I do not disagree that there are circumstance when firefighters need to leave before the low-air alarm such as was clearly the case in Charleston, SC. This should have been the call of the incident commander to evacuate and go to a defensive operation. For safety reasons, we are encouraging firefighters to make the call of a dangerous situation or order. In this case, to infer that a decision to leave before the low-air alarm should be left to the individual firefighter; is to encourage chaos.

The reason is that there is no standard or measurement to make this decision. How would a firefighter make this decision? Based on time, psi, liters (cubic feet), smoke, fire, complexity of the building, etc.? If we just look at time, the low-air alarm activates (30-minute SCBA) with six minutes left (theoretically at 20-25 percent of air left). Now we are training the firefighter to leave before this alarm at their discretion. Should they leave one minute early, two, five and on? Would every firefighter make the same call? What if the more experienced officer disagrees? What if the chief disagrees? What if the lawyer of the parents of the child not found in the primary search disagrees?

There is an old saying that if you want to manage something, you must be able to measure it. One simple example occurs everyday in career fire departments when they measure if you are on-time using a specific time. Subjective judgments on the other hand are always open to Monday morning quarterbacks. Again, I believe that if firefighters are leaving the IDLH environment when their low-air alarm sounds, that is a safety success story.

In the early 1970’s, my department had SCBA’s on all apparatus. However, on the engines, the officer and layout man had 15-minute masks. The justification for the layout man was that he was riding the back step and would be left at the hydrant to connect the supply line and charge it. Then he had to run up to the engine down the street. The officer, well he was an old man. The use of the 15 minute mask was eventually eliminated. At the national level (NFPA) it was decided that it did not provide enough time working in the IDLH environment and was unsafe.

I am not sure what the solution should be, but maybe the 30-minute SCBA is not safe enough for many fires (other than house fires). I worked at a Rescue Squad that would be dispatched to fires and other emergencies at the Washington Metro Subway. Besides our regular 30-minute air tanks for the 4.5 masks, we also had 60-minute air tanks for use in the subway system and high-rise fires. In addition, we had several 4 hours chemical re-breathers.

The advantages of a 60-minute SCBA are a longer time to exit as well as more working time in the IDLH environment. If we are having a problem with firefighter deaths directly caused by not enough air, we should change our equipment, not rely on a subjective decision by an individual firefighter. Finally, a firefighter in good aerobic conditioning can operate for longer times than the couch potato on the same amount of air.

L. Charles Smeby, Jr. M.P.P., MIFireE
University of Florida Fire & Emergency Services Distance Learning

Gary Morris Responds:
Chief Smeby asked a number of questions regarding my article on proper SCBA use, published in the July issue of FireRescue. His primary concern was my opinion that firefighters should plan to exit a burning building before the SCBA low-air warning device activates. I appreciate Chief Smeby’s response and respect his views; he's a well-respected fire professional and author with more than 30 years of experience in the fire service field.

I have a passion for firefighter safety and survival. Early in my career, I was nearly killed on two separate occasions. A building collapsed as my partner and I were about to climb a ground ladder to vent the roof at a commercial building fire. One member of the crew raising the ladder was killed and others injured. A year later, I was pulled unconscious from a large tank at a confined space rescue when my SCBA air supply ran out. Those events caused me to seriously think about my own survival in a high-risk career, and the safety and survival of all firefighters.

I penned the July article from what I believe is a modern proactive and progressive view for improving firefighter safety in the American fire service. Proper SCBA air management is a critical aspect of firefighter survival. If a firefighter does not monitor his SCBA air supply and runs out of air in a burning building there is a VERY NARROW window for his survival.

Today’s smoke is far more toxic than when both Chief Smeby and I started our fire service careers more than three decades ago. In one fatal case I investigated the carbon monoxide saturation in the firefighters blood was 70 percent at the emergency room. The medical examiner believed the firefighter was rendered unconscious in 30 seconds and likely dead in another 60 seconds once exposed to smoke. The message to our firefighters: If you run out of air, you have a high probability of dying! With such immediate killing affects of toxic gases, the rapid intervention team (RIT) may not have time to rescue you (see comments below on RIT rescue times).

Thus, the two major recommendations in the article: One, firefighters MUST continually monitor their air supply so that they can plan an exit in time. Two, fire department SOPs and training should require the firefighter to exit before the low-air warning activates. This ensures there will be some reserve air should he get lost or is blocked while exiting.

So with that in mind, let’s have a discussion about Chief Smeby’s thoughts and comments.

Chief Smeby is correct that the NFPA standard does not mandate exit from an IDLH atmosphere before the low air warning activates. As I stated in my article, based on my experience and research, I believe such exit should be mandatory with the use of “shall” language in the standard instead of “should”. The fact remains that waiting for the low-air warning to activate in a very toxic atmosphere leaves the firefighter with very limited reserve air supply. This may not allow the firefighter time to exit a large square footage building or even a smaller building if there are unexpected hindrances to the exit. Further, low-air warning devices have failed to activate or have activated below the required 25% of operating pressure leaving the firefighter with even less air than expected. Failure of the firefighter to exit before the alarm activates can leave him in a life-threatening situation.

Chief Smeby states he does not disagree that there are circumstances where firefighters need to leave a building before the low-air warning activates and cites the Charleston, S.C., tragedy as an example when the IC should have ordered an earlier evacuation. I don’t believe any fire officer would disagree the IC in that case should have ordered an evacuation earlier.

He further states (in reference to the firefighter deciding to exit before the low-air warning activates),”We are encouraging firefighters to make the call on a dangerous situation or order. In this case, to infer that a decision to leave before the low air alarm should be to left to the individual is encouraging chaos.”

I strongly disagree. First, firefighters already make this individual decision – that being the unsafe practice of exiting the building once the low-air warning activates. And that action doesn’t require permission and doesn’t create chaos (unless he runs out of air before exiting). Further, this “individual” decision is never questioned by the company officer or IC. When the warning activates, firefighters begin the exit sequence. An SOP requiring exit before the low-air warning will not create chaos. It only means the firefighter is exiting earlier with more reserve air.

Clearly, the firefighter in a burning building is the one person at the greatest risk – and the only one who can monitor their air supply. The IC cannot possibly monitor a firefighter's air supply. Any firefighter who is approaching a turnaround point on his air supply MUST begin the exit sequence. He doesn’t need permission to do so except to cause the IC to be notified of the action.

For clarity, when I speak in my comments about the “firefighters'” decision to exit I’m implying that they also apply the proper notification process within the incident command system. All firefighters must enter the hazard zone as a team (minimum two-person) with either a company officer or designated “lead” member. All must be equipped with a portable radio. The first member whose air supply has reached the turn-around point must notify the company officer or the lead member. No member should be allowed to exit alone. There should be no need to obtain permission to exit. However, the division, group or sector officer must be notified of the decision to exit as soon as safe to do so (and routed to the IC).

Chief Smeby asks, “How would a firefighter make this (exit) decision”? I’ll first base my answer on my SCUBA diving experience (I'm a master diver). When diving, (sometimes at near-zero visibility), I repeatedly check my air pressure for consumption rates and update my calculations for when to turn around and then begin the ascent sequence. This calculation always assumes that I will have 500 pounds at surface. Monitoring air supply is simple to do.

Although checking an SCBA console for an air-pressure reading in thick smoke may be a little more difficult, it can and must be done frequently. The modern SCBA console has digital, back-lighted, numerical figures which improves the reading when placed in front of the facepiece. Additionally, with the current “heads up” display capability for the facepiece, it’s even more convenient to monitor air consumption and calculate a turnaround point and exit before the low-air light and warning activates. Simply put, constant monitoring of air consumption allows the firefighter to gauge when to leave the building.

I agree with Chief Smeby that there are no black and white absolutes in our business. Our SOPs serve as guidelines. The target of training and SOPs with regard to proper and safe SCBA use should always be to exit the building before the low-air warning activates. We have smart firefighters. They have the ability to calculate their planned exit before the low-air warning activates.

I also agree there may be justified exceptions for delaying exit. For example, another crew has discovered a victim in an adjacent room. They have requested assistance to quickly remove the victim. Committing to the rescue will cause the low-air warning to activate. Because of a known quick exit, continuing the rescue after the low-air warning activates may be justified in this case. However, allowing fire crews to routinely suck their last pound of air out of the SCBA bottle just as they stumble out of the door is just plain stupid and cannot be justified.

Chief Smeby asked how the firefighter would determine when to leave a building with a 30-minute bottle before the low-air warning activated. He suggested the bottle would have 6 minutes of reserve air (after the alarm activated). To answer the question, let’s first discuss actual air consumption rates and available reserve air. As referenced in my article, new NFPA standards increased the consumption rate calculations on SCBA bottles from 40 liters per minute to 100 liters per minute. This change reflects a more realistic rate of consumption of air by firefighters while engaging in hard labor (we all know the “30-minute” bottle” never lasted 30 minutes). What this means is all sizes of SCBA bottles have less air time than previously rated as well as less reserve air at 25 percent when the low air warning activates than previously rated. Under the old rating, the 30-minute bottle was supposed to have about 6 minutes of air remaining. Now, with the higher consumption rates, the 30-minute bottle may only have 3 minutes (or less) of reserve air. Again, waiting for the low-air warning to activate with 3 minutes or less of air in a large building can create a life-threatening situation for the firefighter. As stated in the article, I believe the firefighter MUST constantly monitor his air consumption and plan on an exit prior to the low-air warning to ensure ultimate safety for the firefighter.

As to the question of the officer or chief disagreeing when to start the exit, the judgment should ALWAYS be in favor of safety for the firefighter at risk. If the firefighter is running low on air, it’s time to exit.

Chief Smeby is correct when he states the NFPA “at a national level” decided the old “15-minute” sling SCBA was unsafe. With the current NFPA standard, that same organization is taking, what I believe, are the initial steps in determining that the practice of waiting for a low-air warning before exiting a building also places the firefighter at risk. These are consensus standards, meaning that there were members of the committee not yet ready to rise to the “shall” language being included in the current standard. It does not prohibit a future standard from requiring an earlier exit.

As happened with the old 15-minute sling SCBA, the 30-minute bottle may prove to be inadequate for some fire departments. While I was fire chief in Seattle, following three “near misses” (two nearly fatal) in 2001 while using 30-minute bottles, the department went to the 1,800-liter, 45-minute bottles and upgraded its SCBA with the heads-up display for easy monitoring of air supply. Because of the larger capacity bottle, there was a greater reserve air capacity (4.5 minutes) once the low-air warning activated. It should be noted we also initiated a “safety stand down” following the third near-miss and conducted a crash course on back to the basics safety and survival training for all members.

Following the Phoenix firefighter fatality referenced in my article, both Phoenix and Seattle conducted independent research projects to determine the realistic capabilities of RITs to affect a rescue of a downed firefighter. Phoenix was using 30-minute bottles at the time. Exercises were conducted in 5,000-7,000-square-foot buildings. Actual service time for the bottles was 16-18 minutes, depending on age and fitness levels of firefighters. As to search, rescue and extraction of the firefighter, the average time was 21 minutes in Phoenix and 19 minutes in Seattle (they used only a 5,000-square-foot building). The minimum number of firefighters required to achieve a rescue was 11 in Seattle and 12 in Phoenix.

There are three important messages we need to deliver to firefighters following this research: First, rapid intervention MAY NOT be rapid. Second, search and rescue times may exceed the air supply remaining in the lost firefighter's bottle – and certainly exceeds what is remaining once the low-air warning activates. And the final message to the firefighter: NEVER run out of air! You may die quickly.

I agree somewhat with Chief Smeby’s position,”If we’re having a problem with firefighter deaths directly caused by not enough air, we should change our equipment." The fire service has done a lot of that and we’re still having fatalities. We can have the latest technology in SCBA, but without proper SOPs, training and proper use of the equipment by the firefighter, we will not eliminate fatalities. And there are many cases of improper use of SCBAs that’s got firefighters in trouble. As stated in my article, I believe adopting the “exit before the low-air warning” position, along with appropriate SOPs and training, will go a long way in improving firefighter safety and survival when using SCBA.

The American fire service has more than 200 years of traditions. Some are very good. I like red fire trucks and I like the camaraderie of a close-nit fire crew. On the other hand, I hate line-of-duty death funerals. Sometimes old traditions – or, “we’ve always done it this way” – gets in the way of change, even when the “change proposal” has clear safety benefits.

Both Chief Smeby and I joined fire departments in the early 1970s. I suspect he may have experienced a similar culture as I found when I joined the Phoenix Fire Department just as SCBAs were first introduced. As a young “proby," I was ridiculed for regularly wearing mine by the senior members. According to these members, “real firefighters” didn’t wear them. We now know the devastating results of that attitude on their health. Then, along came hazardous materials. We would rush into those incidents with the same aggression as fighting a structural fire and BLEVEs killed many. We rejected the early concern of bloodborne pathogens. Eventually, OSHA stepped in and established an SOP telling how to conduct hazmat operations, and few have died since. They did the same with bloodborne pathogens. Next came the “two-in, two-out” rule, and we complained it would reduce the ability to execute a quick rescue of trapped victims and people would die. Much of the fire service also screamed bloody murder over the NFPA 1500: Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program in the late 1980s. We can be a stubborn lot.

I believe our fire service leadership should be both proactive and progressive in our safety efforts and solve our own problems. We don’t need any outside agencies establishing our operational practices for us. We can do it better with a progressive attitude. But if we don’t, they will.