Deadly WindsOne year later, remembering the lessons learned from the Houston double LODDBy FireRescue
magazine staffApril 12 marks the one-year anniversary of a wind-driven house fire that killed two Houston firefighters, Captain James A. Harlow, Sr., and Firefighter Damion J. Hobbs. However tragic the event was, it would be even more of a tragedy not to study the lessons this incident provides about wind-driven fires, fireground communications, the importance of a 360-degree size-up, the timing of ventilation operations and more.
About the Victims
Captain James Harlow, 50, was hired by the HFD in August 1979 and has been a Captain at Fire Station 26 since 2004. |
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Probationary Firefighter Damien Hobbs, 29, graduated from the HFD Val Jahnke Training Facility on March 3, 2009, with Class 2008C, and began his first assignment at Station 26 on March 7. |
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Source: Houston Fire Dept.
This photo, taken at 00:26 with a cell phone camera, shows the intense fire created by the strong winds exiting the garage and front windows. (Photo courtesy of the Houston FD)
This photograph taken at 00:27 with a cell phone camera, shows extensive fire through the roof. (Photo courtesy of the Houston FD)
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Incident RecapThis incident recap is taken from the Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office fatality investigation report.
Download the complete report here.On April 12, 2009, City of Houston Fire Department (HFD) Engine 26 Captain James A. Harlow, Sr., and rookie Firefighter Damion J. Hobbs were fatally injured during firefighting operations at a residential single-family house fire. At 12:06 AM, Houston 911 received a report of a house fire at 7811 Oak Vista, inside the city limits of Houston, Texas.
The involved property was a single-family dwelling of wood frame construction, approximately 106 feet long and 54 feet wide. The exterior walls were wood with brick veneer. The interior finish was gypsum board walls and ceilings with wood paneling over some walls. The original construction in 1956 and subsequent additional construction created approximately 4,174 square feet of living space. The structure had large windows on the rear of the house, including solarium glass panels in the den. The rear of the house had a large elevated wooden deck approximately 20 feet above a large yard along a bayou area.
Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs responded to the scene on Engine 26 from Station 26, approximately two miles from the fire scene, arriving at the front, west side of the house seven minutes after dispatch. Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs entered the front door of the house and advanced a line to the central hallway and den. There were 15 to 20 mph sustained winds from the east-southeast, with gusts over 25 mph across the open area of the bayou, blowing into the house through the rear windows.
Wind-driven fire conditions produced a rapid fire growth that forced Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs to withdraw and they collapsed while attempting to exit. Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs were found and removed to the front yard where resuscitation attempts were unsuccessful.
Lessons LearnedFireRescue editor-in-chief Tim Sendelbach notes the following takeaways for company officers and chiefs.
· Consider the wind: It's been said many times before about the importance of size-up, but this incident brings a factor seldom considered in residential fire attacks—wind conditions. More and more we are learning that today’s fireground is much different than in years past. Company officers today need to give strong consideration to wind conditions and ventilation (coordinated and uncoordinated) and the roles they can or will play on rapid fire development.
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Use a TIC: If possible, size-ups and fire attacks should be conducted with the support of a thermal imaging camera (TIC). What we can’t visually see with our eyes (due to a lack of light in nighttime or heavy smoke operations), we might very well be able to see via the images of a TIC. Use everything we can to see and understand fire conditions, and the environment in which we intend to do battle.
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Communicate clearly: Never once have we experienced an incident where some form of communications was not compromised. As unfortunate as this may be, WE (firefighters, company officers and chief officers) need to make every effort to ensure we communicate effectively. When possible, that communications should be face-to-face with our crew. When using a radio, we should use a clear, calm voice and ALWAYS require the message to be repeated by the receiving party. Closed loop communication is a MUST. If they don’t repeat the message, we leave it open for misinterpretation.
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Slow down: Finally, we need to slow our incident operations down to give the first-in crews the opportunity to provide an initial interior C.A.N.—Conditions, Actions, Needs—report. If we rush in, we oftentimes overcrowd, miss critical clues and potentially overlook critical steps in our attack efforts (e.g., leave behind tools, radios).
Critical lessons for fire chiefs: This fire was ruled accidental, caused by a loose electrical connection. Residential sprinklers would have likely contained this fire to the area of origin. Homeowners would be out a minimal fee for an insurance deductible, repairs would be made and loss kept a minimum. The takeaway: The loss of two of our brothers is too much of a price to pay—WE need to stress the importance of residential sprinklers.
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