The Social Network & Community JUST for Firefighters
Houston Report Finds Errors in 2009 Death of Captain, Firefighter
JAMES PINKERTON
Houston Chronicle
Reprinted with Permission
The failure to fully assess a burning home and then entering the smoky blaze without two-way radios or thermal imaging equipment may have contributed to the deaths of a veteran Houston Fire Department captain and a rookie firefighter battling a wind-whipped house fire last Easter, according to an investigation by the State fire marshal's office.
Read the Report
Firefighter Fatality Investigation - Investigation Number FY 09-01
The bodies of Capt. James A. Harlow, 50, and firefighter Damion J. Hobbs, 29, were recovered inside 7811 Oak Vista about 40 minutes after firetrucks first arrived at the southeast Houston residence last April 12. Harlow and Hobbs' engine truck was the first on the scene, at about 12:07 a.m., and the two, along with a third firefighter, mounted a “fast attack,“ entering the empty home where a fire fueled by 30 mph wind gusts was intensified by the collapse of a large glass wall at the rear of the house.
An elderly couple that lived in the home already had left, after seeing smoke and fire coming from a bedroom closet. Arson investigators later blamed the blaze on a loose electrical connection in a light fixture.
“There were several factors that, when combined, may have contributed to the deaths of Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs,“ concludes a 47-page report compiled by the state fire marshal, which made six findings. “It is important that we honor them by learning from the incident.”
Acting Houston Fire Chief Rick Flanagan on Monday would not comment on fire marshal's report, saying he has read only excerpts from the review, which was posted online. Later Monday, Flanagan released the Houston Fire Department's own internal review of the fire.
“Our report, basically, says that the officers, from the team perspective, did everything according to our guidelines to address this fire,“ Flanagan said.
Chief backs firefighters
The chief defended firefighters' actions and said no disciplinary action was contemplated against any firefighter on the call.
The HFD report raised three of the six issues discussed in the fire marshal's review.
HFD and the fire marshal's reports note that firefighters did not do a complete assessment of the fire or cut off utilities before entering the dwelling.
As a result, firefighters did not see a large glass wall at the rear that later collapsed and allowed strong winds to fan the flames.
“A rapid and full assessment of the scene would have provided information regarding the potential impact of the large glass wall, together with the impact of wind, on the interior suppression tactics,“ the fire marshal report states.
According to both reports, the HFD commander on the scene tried to contact Harlow and Hobbs by radio, but Harlow had left his two-way radio in the engine truck and Hobbs' radio was found turned off and tuned to a different channel.
The two reports also note that a thermal imaging camera was not taken inside the residence by Harlow's crew to help gauge the intensity of the fire.
Separated during fire
The fire marshal's report also cited the location of a ventilation hole punched in the roof by firefighters on a ladder truck, saying it put Harlow and Hobbs between the fire and the exiting air.
The fire marshal's report further noted Hobbs and Harlow became separated from their fire hose, which was their only guide out of the smoky, burning home. It also stated the two firefighters were standing as they battled the fire, instead of crouching to avoid the intense heat.
Flanagan said he would not “speculate” if different decisions would have saved the two firefighters' lives.
“I don't want to second-guess the officers, because I wasn't there. I know the things they did at this fire were according to our guidelines,“ Flanagan said. “The officer has to make his decision once he does his size-up. The size-up was done. Now, he didn't do the full 360 degrees that would have given more and full information to make a better decision.”
Jeff Caynon, president of the Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association, said he had not seen either report.
“No fire is exactly the same,“ Caynon said. “No checklist is going to completely prepare you for the complex nature of the fire ground.”
Use of radios stressed
HFD's 20-page report of the fire makes 21 “quality assurance findings“ and includes a time line of the actions taken during the fire.
The HFD report noted fire officials in command controlled the fire, and after discovering Harlow and Hobbs had not responded to calls quickly sent a team to enter the home and find them.
The use of radios at fire scenes should be reinforced by training and practice, according to the HFD report. It also recommended firefighters enter a structure in a low stance to enhance their chance of survival.
Harlow's entry team at first was made up of three firefighters, but one had to leave because of a helmet malfunction.
HFD's report said the entire team should have left the burning house until the equipment was fixed.
The blaze remains under investigation by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, which reviews all line-of-duty firefighter deaths.
james.pinkerton@chron.com
Houston Chronicle
Reprinted with Permission
The failure to fully assess a burning home and then entering the smoky blaze without two-way radios or thermal imaging equipment may have contributed to the deaths of a veteran Houston Fire Department captain and a rookie firefighter battling a wind-whipped house fire last Easter, according to an investigation by the State fire marshal's office.
Read the Report
Firefighter Fatality Investigation - Investigation Number FY 09-01
An elderly couple that lived in the home already had left, after seeing smoke and fire coming from a bedroom closet. Arson investigators later blamed the blaze on a loose electrical connection in a light fixture.
“There were several factors that, when combined, may have contributed to the deaths of Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs,“ concludes a 47-page report compiled by the state fire marshal, which made six findings. “It is important that we honor them by learning from the incident.”
Acting Houston Fire Chief Rick Flanagan on Monday would not comment on fire marshal's report, saying he has read only excerpts from the review, which was posted online. Later Monday, Flanagan released the Houston Fire Department's own internal review of the fire.
“Our report, basically, says that the officers, from the team perspective, did everything according to our guidelines to address this fire,“ Flanagan said.
Chief backs firefighters
The chief defended firefighters' actions and said no disciplinary action was contemplated against any firefighter on the call.
The HFD report raised three of the six issues discussed in the fire marshal's review.
HFD and the fire marshal's reports note that firefighters did not do a complete assessment of the fire or cut off utilities before entering the dwelling.
As a result, firefighters did not see a large glass wall at the rear that later collapsed and allowed strong winds to fan the flames.
“A rapid and full assessment of the scene would have provided information regarding the potential impact of the large glass wall, together with the impact of wind, on the interior suppression tactics,“ the fire marshal report states.
According to both reports, the HFD commander on the scene tried to contact Harlow and Hobbs by radio, but Harlow had left his two-way radio in the engine truck and Hobbs' radio was found turned off and tuned to a different channel.
The two reports also note that a thermal imaging camera was not taken inside the residence by Harlow's crew to help gauge the intensity of the fire.
Separated during fire
The fire marshal's report also cited the location of a ventilation hole punched in the roof by firefighters on a ladder truck, saying it put Harlow and Hobbs between the fire and the exiting air.
The fire marshal's report further noted Hobbs and Harlow became separated from their fire hose, which was their only guide out of the smoky, burning home. It also stated the two firefighters were standing as they battled the fire, instead of crouching to avoid the intense heat.
Flanagan said he would not “speculate” if different decisions would have saved the two firefighters' lives.
“I don't want to second-guess the officers, because I wasn't there. I know the things they did at this fire were according to our guidelines,“ Flanagan said. “The officer has to make his decision once he does his size-up. The size-up was done. Now, he didn't do the full 360 degrees that would have given more and full information to make a better decision.”
Jeff Caynon, president of the Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association, said he had not seen either report.
“No fire is exactly the same,“ Caynon said. “No checklist is going to completely prepare you for the complex nature of the fire ground.”
Use of radios stressed
HFD's 20-page report of the fire makes 21 “quality assurance findings“ and includes a time line of the actions taken during the fire.
The HFD report noted fire officials in command controlled the fire, and after discovering Harlow and Hobbs had not responded to calls quickly sent a team to enter the home and find them.
The use of radios at fire scenes should be reinforced by training and practice, according to the HFD report. It also recommended firefighters enter a structure in a low stance to enhance their chance of survival.
Harlow's entry team at first was made up of three firefighters, but one had to leave because of a helmet malfunction.
HFD's report said the entire team should have left the burning house until the equipment was fixed.
The blaze remains under investigation by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, which reviews all line-of-duty firefighter deaths.
james.pinkerton@chron.com
Replies to This Discussion
-
Permalink Reply by TOMMY on
-
AMEN BRYCE....
THE WORD "DEFENSIVE ATTACK" IS AND HAS BEEN FOR SOOOOOO.... LONG... BEEN REMOVED FROM THE MINDSETS OF SO MANY FIREFIGHTERS THAT MANY DONT KNOW IN AN UPFRONT WAY... HOW TO STAY ALIVE AT THE THRESHOLD INCIDENT. THE INCIDENT WHERE EVERYTHING SEEMS TO GO WRONG THAT OTHERWISE WOULD ORDINARLY GO O.K. THE INCIDENT THAT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO CHANGE A DEPARTMENT... OR THE ENTIRE FIRE SERVICE FOR THAT MATTER... IF THINGS GO WRONG.
A QUICK EXTERIOR ATTACK IN SOME CASES... WILL ADDRESS THE FIRST INCIDENT PRIORITY(LIFE SAFETY) WITH LIMITED STAFFING AND ACCOMPLISH MUCH TO ALLOW FF'S THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOUNT AN OFFENSIVE ATTACK. A MORE FLUID... TRANSITIONAL... MIND SET OF... LETS GET IT KNOCKED DOWN AND THEN WE'LL GO OFFENSIVE IF CONDITIONS ALLOW... WOULD SAVE DOZENS OF FIREFIGHTERS LIVES A YEAR.
REST EASY BROTHERS FROM HOUSTON... I'M SURE HUNDREDS WILL LEARN FROM THIS TRAGEDY.. IF THEY WILL ONLY BE OPEN MINDED ENOUGH TO EMBRACE ALL THE RELEVANT FACTS FROM INCIDENTS LIKE THIS ONE...
-
Permalink Reply by Eat The Roof on
-
"Why do we continue to think that we need to mingle with the fire trying to put it out. Put large amounts of water on it from an exterior position to make it safe to go in."
Wait for it......wait for it.......
Really is that what we should do? Start putting water on smoke from the outside?until when?All the time?How about for a stove fire? A mattress fire? A chair fire?how would that have helped in this situation?This fire started in an interior closet space so pounding it from the outside would have done absolutely NOTHING to mitigate fire conditions.
When the first engine arrived they reported heavy smoke showing.How does that justify anything but an interior attack? Under what conditions do we actually enter a structure?Just because you dump some water in from the outside doesn't guarantee that fire conditions on the inside will improve,most of the time it just delays actually getting water onto the seat of the fire and allows it to grow unabated.
Very few of the LODD's can be attributed to aggressive interior operations especially in a one story residence.
Saving Life is our #1 priority, ourselves included, but that does not absolve you from making reasonable or calculated efforts to save the building or the contents within.Most of us are provided the gear and training that will allow us to do this in a safe and measured way.
It was not the "quick attack"that killed Capt.Harlow and FF Hobbs but two tactical and one incidental error(s) that IMO were the primary factors leading to the tragedy
1.The boss had no radio-so the crew was incommunicado the entire time
2. The attack team lost contact with it's line
3.The 3rd firefighter on the line had to leave at a critical time and this left only a rookie(at his first fire) on the pipe.
None of us were there and I am loath to critique from my comfortably distant position in the light of day.There were errors made and 2 FF's paid with their lives,but going "Quick Attack"was not one of them.
We will never make this job perfectly safe, there are inherent hazards and many others unforeseen associated with interior firefighting, but I'll be damned if I am going to start letting structures burn to the ground because I am unwilling to enter them based solely on life hazard or lack thereof.I would further suggest that if you are unwilling to take on ANY risk whatsoever, that you find another line of work.
-
Permalink Reply by Art "ChiefReason" Goodrich on
-
Go to FDIC this year.
It is my understanding that there will be discussion this year on the whole "Go/No Go" issue.
Chain of errors killed the two Houston firefighters. Read the report. A single error didn't result in their deaths. There was a chain and once it started, it didn't stop until the PAR was done and two fallen firefighters were found and removed from the house.
Honor them by learning from their mistakes is excellent advice. But, open your eyes, look at the total package and use it to help you.
We need to discuss the LODDs. Call it whatever you want; critique, Monday morning quarterbacking, armchairing; I don't care what you call it in an effort to stifle open discussion about it. It must be discussed and questions answered if we ever want to lower the LODDs. I will not chastise anyone for asking, unless it is in a condolence thread. Then, I will ask the poster to go to the appropriate thread, but when the article or report is posted as a news item, then there needs to be discussion. And I really don't care if you're Bobby Halton or Bobby King; don't tell me that we don't have a right to talk about it. Ever. I respect everyone else for their opinions and I'm not as passionate about those who don't respect mine. It really doesn't matter if Joe Blow doesn't think if I should be asking the question. He didn't raise me/he didn't train me.
I appreciate the heads up, but I'll take the heat for a question. After all, I'm a firefighter and I don't sweat the small stuff.
IMHO.
-
Permalink Reply by Scott Climer on
-
EXCELLENT, Tommy!
-
Permalink Reply by John Crabbe on
-
They followed dept policy. "did it by the book." THEN CHANGE THE DAMN BOOK.
Bryce Riddell A QUICK EXTERIOR ATTACK IN SOME CASES... WILL ADDRESS THE FIRST INCIDENT PRIORITY(LIFE SAFETY) WITH LIMITED STAFFING AND ACCOMPLISH MUCH TO ALLOW FF'S THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOUNT AN OFFENSIVE ATTACK. Tommy
I won't say either is wrong here, but hindsight is 20/20 and neither of you really addressed some of the other issues at hand like the lack of radios and TIC. The other issue is that we were not there to know what the conditions were when the crew first arrived on scene. The report states that heavy smoke was encountered upon arrival and that a "fast attack" was being initiated. It further states the two FF's were overcome by a wind driven fire while trying to exit. The fire was intensified by 30 mph wind gusts by the collapse of a large glass wall at the rear of the house. It is possible that the wall did not collapse until the firefighters were already inside.
Point is, I would say you both are advocating a transitional type of fire attack, by doing a quick exterior knock down before going interior if necessary. I can agree with that, but the issue here is we don't really know if there was fire showing when the crew entered, so to say "change the book" may not really be the issue here, neither would the advocacy of an exterior operation necessarily be the case.
What this incident DOES highlight is the importance of doing a size up and 360, the importance of a radio for EVERY member, and the importance of TICs. This is something in which every dept should and can learn from. Advocating an exterior knockdown approach is a technique that may not be applicable in every situation, the other highlighted issues, however, are applicable in every situation.
-
-
John, agreed and pretty much what I was trying to convey,only you were much more diplomatic about it.
I'm not as sold on the absolute use of the TIC -I have seen it create tunnel vision which led to delayed or poor decision making in situations when instinctive firefighting should have been employed. i.e. Do you know what an RFE looks like on your TIC screen?Is the TIC really going to give you much of an early warning before a rapid fire event? More so than,seeing hearing and feeling sudden changes in smoke or fire conditions? or that sinking feeling in the pit of your stomach and the wall of heat that hits you?
I have seen tendencies by young officers to be overly reliant and focused on the TIC, while ignoring some of the more subtle and not so subtle clues that are present during fire attack.In other words they need to be developing their fire instincts,and the TIC tends to distract them from doing that.I like it as a supplement but many times never even look at it during a fire.
So yes use the TIC but know it's limitations and don't let it dull the firefighting instincts that you need to develop in order to become a good firefighter.
Art chiefreason-Were you addressing a specific post or speaking more generally? Just curious
-
-
ETR:
The post that I was referring to in this discussion is gone; most likely deleted by the poster.
But, honestly; I am sick and tired of some saying that we should "wait" until all the facts are in. Really? Anyone seen a NIOSH on this yet? No? That's because it's still "pending". But, I have seen Houston's State Fire Marshal's Report and have read it thoroughly and know from reading it that it is well worth discussing. Just off the top of my head, you had wind-driven elements, no D-sector reconnaissance, vent above both victims, crew integrity issues, interior crew radio left on the truck, TIC in front yard...with all respect to Houston FD, this is what I was referring to with Grimwood's error chain analogy.
There are many lessons learned in this report and a review of your own department's SOGs will honor Harlow and Hobbs.
And as I said earlier, talking about it is the only way.
- ‹ Previous
- 1
- 2
- Next ›
© 2024 Created by Firefighter Nation WebChief.
Powered by
