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Out of Tragedy: One year later, the lessons from the Buffalo double LODD fire are still fresh
Out of Tragedy
One year later, the lessons from the Buffalo double LODD fire are still fresh
By FireRescue magazine staff
At last year’s Fire-Rescue International conference, the mood was subdued. As the conference was opening, two firefighters were killed in the line-of-duty at a fire in Buffalo. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and Firefighter Jonathan Croom, both of the Buffalo Fire Department, were killed on Aug. 24, 2009, while responding to reports of civilians trapped in a mixed commercial/residential structure. One year later, we take a look back at the incident and the lessons that it provides, as well as some of the changes taking place within the department as a result of these lessons.
NIOSH Recommendations:
Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
THE INCIDENT
The following information is adapted from the NIOSH report on this fire.
The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for a fire with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. They made repeated attempts to force entry through this door, but it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the first and second floors with no civilians found.
Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional personnel with special tools were sent to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2.
McCarthy and two firefighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify that all firefighters had exited a first-floor deli. Following a hoseline into the structure, McCarthy was well ahead of the other two firefighters when the first floor partially collapsed beneath him. He fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire.
The other two firefighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. McCarthy made several mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device.
There was confusion on scene when trying to verify who was calling the mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement. The IC was aware that crews were attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure.
Simultaneously, Croom, a member of the firefighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside McCarthy’s point of entry when the mayday calls went out. It is believed that Croom knew where McCarthy was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. Croom grabbed a tool, went on air and entered the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other firefighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device.
McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after McCarthy’s mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the first floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. No civilians were discovered within the structure.
As is any LODD, this incident was extremely painful for the Buffalo Fire Department, and the one-year anniversary exposes wounds that are still healing. However, there are also valuable lessons to be learned from the incident, and a look at some of the actions the department has taken since the incident shows exactly how those lessons are being put into action.
“The Aug. 24, 2009, incident in Buffalo represents one of the most stressful types of incidents an incident commander could ever encounter: an incident with a reported occupant trapped immediately followed by a firefighter mayday,” says FireRescue Editor-in-Chief Tim Sendelbach. “Despite our most valiant efforts, we cannot forecast or prevent every hazard on the fireground. In this case, a floor collapse and subsequent rescue attempt claims the life of two of Buffalo’s bravest.”
Following are a few points for discussion from Sendelbach and Buffalo Division Chief Pat Britzzalaro.
Mayday events
One lesson Sendelbach sees in this incident: the need to “slow down to speed up”—something he admits is easily said, yet hard to accomplish. “Mayday events create a surge of adrenaline that far exceeds our wildest imagination,” Sendelbach says. “The only way to effectively manage a mayday incident is to first get control—slow the incident down. Identify the extent of the problem (number of firefighters involved and their situation—missing, trapped, lost or disoriented, etc.), determine the quickest, most direct access (via natural openings or alternative means), deploy the initial RIT/FAST and call for additional resources (stage upon arrival, rotate crews to ensure only fresh crews are deployed in high-risk environments).”
Britzzalaro says that one of the positive outcomes from the incident is enhanced mayday training, designed to prepare firefighters and incident commanders for exactly the situation Sendelbach refers to. “We started the mayday training prior to this incident, but following the fire, we updated and enhanced the training, and we have now completed mayday training for the entire Buffalo Fire Department” Britzzalaro says. “We incorporated self-rescue and self-evacuation into our mayday training because we felt that it was very important—although the FAST is going to come in, it’s always good to be able to help yourself, too. We were also able to get better simulation props that put the firefighters into a more realistic mayday scenarios.”
Risk-vs.-Reward
Sendelbach points out that this was a complex incident, involving the potential of high risk, but also high reward because victims were reported trapped inside. “Upon arrival, we never know whether a structure is occupied,” Sendelbach says. “Always consider what resources you have available to determine whether occupants are inside.” These can include firefighters conducting an interior search, direct observation by firefighters via a 360-degree survey or witnesses, exiting occupants, police officers, etc.
“When a life risk is confirmed to be in danger, or highly probable, adjust the risk accordingly—but always consider tenability and viability,” Sendelbach says. “We will take calculated risk to search and rescue viable victims from tenable spaces. But too much heat, too much smoke, too much damage, too much time—all of these equal too much risk—No go!” He stresses that risk-vs.-gain decisions are affected by the specifics of the structure, the fire, the experience of the crew and a multitude of other factors—in short, they’re rarely black and white, and ultimately come down to the judgment of the IC or the company officer.
Again, this is an area that Buffalo is addressing through increased training. “We plan on sending our chief officers and up-and-coming chief officers to safety and incident operation courses through the National Fire Academy and the New York State Fire Academy in Montour Falls, N.Y.,” Britzzalaro says. “We’re also planning to hold classes at our own academy on command and control of incident operations.”
Communications
Britzzalaro explains that another positive change to come out of this incident is a relatively simple yet important change in the department’s radios. “Prior to the fire, you’d have to look at the radio to determine which channel you were on—1, 2 or 3,” he says. “Now, the radio verbally tells you what channel you’re on. It takes out the guesswork.” Another useful feature of the radio—if the firefighter scrolls too far through the channels, they eventually wind up back on channels 1, 2, 3—making the radios even easier to use with gloved hands.
Radio communication was a factor in the LODD because Lt. McCarthy’s radio was found to be on the wrong channel. Although personnel at the scene physically heard his mayday calls, they were actually transmitted over the incorrect radio channel, and it’s uncertain whether he was able to hear radio communication from command when they responded to his calls for help.
Other Enhancements
In addition to the above enhancements in training, Britzzalaro notes that the department is working on a new SOP for basement operation and has implemented a new SOP for thermal imaging cameras (TICs). TICs are now used at all incidents. Although TICs were used in the LODD incident, Lt. McCarthy didn’t have one when he entered the structure. The department is also looking into how video simulators can be used in its training program to build size-up skills and help company officers and incident commanders practice reacting to unexpected fireground conditions. “During these video simulations, the officers have radios and practice communicating with the IC,” Britzzalaro says. “This helps them learn how to give complete, accurate and concise information to the IC as the fireground conditions change.”
Finally, although SCBAs were not an issue in the fire, Buffalo will be updating its SCBAs, which are now 11 years old. “We’re looking at different manufacturers and evaluating different features on the SCBAs,” Britzzalaro says. “We haven’t had any problems with our current SCBA, but we want to make sure that our people have the best possible equipment.”
IN REMEMBRANCE
Sendelbach offers a final thought as we mark the one-year anniversary of this incident:
“In respect of our brothers McCarthy and Groom, let us never forget the lessons they have left behind. Firefighter safety and survival is not a part-time commitment, it’s our daily duty, EVERY DAY. Never underestimate the routine incident, never over-estimate your abilities and always work within the confines of a defined risk-management plan.”
Copyright © Elsevier Inc., a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. SUBSCRIBE to FIRERESCUE
One year later, the lessons from the Buffalo double LODD fire are still fresh
By FireRescue magazine staff
At last year’s Fire-Rescue International conference, the mood was subdued. As the conference was opening, two firefighters were killed in the line-of-duty at a fire in Buffalo. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and Firefighter Jonathan Croom, both of the Buffalo Fire Department, were killed on Aug. 24, 2009, while responding to reports of civilians trapped in a mixed commercial/residential structure. One year later, we take a look back at the incident and the lessons that it provides, as well as some of the changes taking place within the department as a result of these lessons.
Close-up of secured store front showing security grating. Photo courtesy police photographer
First door encountered by firefighters on Side 2. Photo courtesy police photographer
NIOSH Recommendations:
- Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and
develop, implement and enforce an SOP that addresses strategies and
tactics for this type of fire. - Ensure that the IC receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
- Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
- Ensure that the IC receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that they can account for all personnel operating at an
incident. - Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the IC, is appointed at each structure fire.
- Ensure that firefighters use their SCBA and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
- Conduct research into refining existing and developing new technologies to track the movement of firefighters inside structures.
- Continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance
verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn SCBA.
THE INCIDENT
The following information is adapted from the NIOSH report on this fire.
The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for a fire with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. They made repeated attempts to force entry through this door, but it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the first and second floors with no civilians found.
Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional personnel with special tools were sent to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2.
McCarthy and two firefighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify that all firefighters had exited a first-floor deli. Following a hoseline into the structure, McCarthy was well ahead of the other two firefighters when the first floor partially collapsed beneath him. He fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire.
The other two firefighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. McCarthy made several mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device.
There was confusion on scene when trying to verify who was calling the mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement. The IC was aware that crews were attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure.
Simultaneously, Croom, a member of the firefighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside McCarthy’s point of entry when the mayday calls went out. It is believed that Croom knew where McCarthy was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. Croom grabbed a tool, went on air and entered the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other firefighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device.
McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after McCarthy’s mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the first floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. No civilians were discovered within the structure.
Funeral Procession for Lt. McCarthy
Funeral Procession for FF Croom
LESSONS LEARNEDFuneral Procession for FF Croom
As is any LODD, this incident was extremely painful for the Buffalo Fire Department, and the one-year anniversary exposes wounds that are still healing. However, there are also valuable lessons to be learned from the incident, and a look at some of the actions the department has taken since the incident shows exactly how those lessons are being put into action.
“The Aug. 24, 2009, incident in Buffalo represents one of the most stressful types of incidents an incident commander could ever encounter: an incident with a reported occupant trapped immediately followed by a firefighter mayday,” says FireRescue Editor-in-Chief Tim Sendelbach. “Despite our most valiant efforts, we cannot forecast or prevent every hazard on the fireground. In this case, a floor collapse and subsequent rescue attempt claims the life of two of Buffalo’s bravest.”
Following are a few points for discussion from Sendelbach and Buffalo Division Chief Pat Britzzalaro.
Mayday events
One lesson Sendelbach sees in this incident: the need to “slow down to speed up”—something he admits is easily said, yet hard to accomplish. “Mayday events create a surge of adrenaline that far exceeds our wildest imagination,” Sendelbach says. “The only way to effectively manage a mayday incident is to first get control—slow the incident down. Identify the extent of the problem (number of firefighters involved and their situation—missing, trapped, lost or disoriented, etc.), determine the quickest, most direct access (via natural openings or alternative means), deploy the initial RIT/FAST and call for additional resources (stage upon arrival, rotate crews to ensure only fresh crews are deployed in high-risk environments).”
Britzzalaro says that one of the positive outcomes from the incident is enhanced mayday training, designed to prepare firefighters and incident commanders for exactly the situation Sendelbach refers to. “We started the mayday training prior to this incident, but following the fire, we updated and enhanced the training, and we have now completed mayday training for the entire Buffalo Fire Department” Britzzalaro says. “We incorporated self-rescue and self-evacuation into our mayday training because we felt that it was very important—although the FAST is going to come in, it’s always good to be able to help yourself, too. We were also able to get better simulation props that put the firefighters into a more realistic mayday scenarios.”
Risk-vs.-Reward
Sendelbach points out that this was a complex incident, involving the potential of high risk, but also high reward because victims were reported trapped inside. “Upon arrival, we never know whether a structure is occupied,” Sendelbach says. “Always consider what resources you have available to determine whether occupants are inside.” These can include firefighters conducting an interior search, direct observation by firefighters via a 360-degree survey or witnesses, exiting occupants, police officers, etc.
“When a life risk is confirmed to be in danger, or highly probable, adjust the risk accordingly—but always consider tenability and viability,” Sendelbach says. “We will take calculated risk to search and rescue viable victims from tenable spaces. But too much heat, too much smoke, too much damage, too much time—all of these equal too much risk—No go!” He stresses that risk-vs.-gain decisions are affected by the specifics of the structure, the fire, the experience of the crew and a multitude of other factors—in short, they’re rarely black and white, and ultimately come down to the judgment of the IC or the company officer.
Again, this is an area that Buffalo is addressing through increased training. “We plan on sending our chief officers and up-and-coming chief officers to safety and incident operation courses through the National Fire Academy and the New York State Fire Academy in Montour Falls, N.Y.,” Britzzalaro says. “We’re also planning to hold classes at our own academy on command and control of incident operations.”
Communications
Britzzalaro explains that another positive change to come out of this incident is a relatively simple yet important change in the department’s radios. “Prior to the fire, you’d have to look at the radio to determine which channel you were on—1, 2 or 3,” he says. “Now, the radio verbally tells you what channel you’re on. It takes out the guesswork.” Another useful feature of the radio—if the firefighter scrolls too far through the channels, they eventually wind up back on channels 1, 2, 3—making the radios even easier to use with gloved hands.
Radio communication was a factor in the LODD because Lt. McCarthy’s radio was found to be on the wrong channel. Although personnel at the scene physically heard his mayday calls, they were actually transmitted over the incorrect radio channel, and it’s uncertain whether he was able to hear radio communication from command when they responded to his calls for help.
Other Enhancements
In addition to the above enhancements in training, Britzzalaro notes that the department is working on a new SOP for basement operation and has implemented a new SOP for thermal imaging cameras (TICs). TICs are now used at all incidents. Although TICs were used in the LODD incident, Lt. McCarthy didn’t have one when he entered the structure. The department is also looking into how video simulators can be used in its training program to build size-up skills and help company officers and incident commanders practice reacting to unexpected fireground conditions. “During these video simulations, the officers have radios and practice communicating with the IC,” Britzzalaro says. “This helps them learn how to give complete, accurate and concise information to the IC as the fireground conditions change.”
Finally, although SCBAs were not an issue in the fire, Buffalo will be updating its SCBAs, which are now 11 years old. “We’re looking at different manufacturers and evaluating different features on the SCBAs,” Britzzalaro says. “We haven’t had any problems with our current SCBA, but we want to make sure that our people have the best possible equipment.”
IN REMEMBRANCE
Sendelbach offers a final thought as we mark the one-year anniversary of this incident:
“In respect of our brothers McCarthy and Groom, let us never forget the lessons they have left behind. Firefighter safety and survival is not a part-time commitment, it’s our daily duty, EVERY DAY. Never underestimate the routine incident, never over-estimate your abilities and always work within the confines of a defined risk-management plan.”
Copyright © Elsevier Inc., a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. SUBSCRIBE to FIRERESCUE
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